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Blanca is a nineteen-year-old undocumented immigrant from
Guatemala. Blanca speaks no English and only a little Spanish. She
comes from a remote region in Guatemala where the primary language
is an indigenous dialect called Xinca. The village Blanca grew up in is
incredibly poor. There is no hospital, illiteracy rates are high, sanitation
is inadequate, and nutritious food can be scarce. She entered the
United States without documentation, hoping to make a better life for
herself. Her son Xavier was born a year later. Xavier is now 19 months
old and Blanca is being deported. Xavier was removed from Blanca’s
care shortly before she was detained. At that time, the state welfare
agency determined that Blanca’s living arrangement, a studio
apartment she shared with two other families, constituted neglect. Since
her detention, Blanca has had little contact with Xavier, but she wishes
to take Xavier with her when she is deported. The family court denied
her request finding that returning to Guatemala with Blanca is
contrary to Xavier’s best interest. The judge then severed Blanca’s
parental rights and Xavier was adopted by Mark and Sandra, a
middle class couple from Encino, California who have been foster
parents to Xavier during Blanca’s year-long detention.

 Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. I would like to
thank Elizabeth Bartholet, Harvard Law School, James Dwyer, William and Mary College of
Law, Martin Guggenheim, New York University Law School, and Thomas Crocker, University
of South Carolina School of Law for their very helpful comments.
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In March 2011, Emily Ruiz, a four-year-old American citizen
boarded a plane from Guatemala to return home to New York.1 Her
grandfather accompanied her, but when he was denied entry into the
United States due to a twenty-year-old immigration violation,
Emily’s family was faced with a dilemma: should Emily return with
her grandfather to Guatemala, should she be allowed to be taken
into state custody, or should her parents, both undocumented
immigrants, risk deportation by attempting to pick her up from U.S.
immigration authorities? Emily’s parents chose to have her return
with her grandfather. The reaction to the story of Emily Ruiz was
immediate. Pro-immigrant supporters expressed outrage at what they
termed the “deportation” of an American citizen.2 Others were
furious that Emily had citizenship at all, calling her an “anchor baby”
and the perfect example of why birthright citizenship must be
eliminated.3 Emily’s story and the passionate reactions it has created
highlight the virulent debate raging in this country over the meaning
of citizenship. This Article focuses on the most important part of
that debate: how birthright citizenship, combined with the massive

1. Girl, Unable to Enter U.S., Will Try Again, CNN.COM (Mar. 29, 2011, 11:57 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/03/29/guatemala.girl.deported/index.htm
l?hpt=T2.
2. Ruben Navarrette Jr., Why Was A Four Year Old American Girl Deported?,
CNN.COM (Mar. 23, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-23/opinion/navarrette.child.
deported_1_illegal-immigrants-anchor-babies-american-girl?_s=PM:OPINION.
3. See CNN.COM, supra note 1 (including comments such as “CNN should show
another pic next to this cute ‘citizen’ of all the resources and fees she will incur because she’s
the product of illegality!” and “Here is another story of a illegal anchor baby. Booo hooo cnn.
Illegal is ILLEGAL and I don’t care what age you are. Want to come to this great country of
ours, go through the proper channels, assimulate [sic] and speak ENGLISH!”).

1141

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/15/2011 1:57 PM

2011

crackdown on illegal immigration, threatens the future of American
democracy.
In my article, Separation, Deportation, Termination,4 I discuss
the increasing practice of separating immigrant parents from their
American-born children and using the parents’ deportation as the
justification for terminating their parental rights. I explain how the
courts that grant these terminations and the child welfare agencies
that seek them do so based on the belief that such terminations are
in the child’s best interest. I also explain that such considerations
violate what has long been (or traditionally) recognized as the
constitutional right of parents to make decisions regarding the care
and control of their children. My goal in Separation, Deportation,
Termination is to demonstrate that these legally unjustified
terminations are occurring and to explain why.5 However, I do not
address the normative question of whether such terminations should
occur. This Article attempts to answer that question.
In this Article, I argue that despite a long-established
presumption favoring parental rights, a children’s rights standard is
appropriate in cases concerning deportable immigrant parents with
children who are American citizens. Such cases involve very different
considerations than typical parental rights termination cases. These
are not simply cases about children’s rights or parental rights.
Rather, these cases raise questions about the very meaning and
purpose of citizenship in a liberal state. The state’s interest in citizen
children far exceeds the state’s interest in their noncitizen parents.6

4. Marcia Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1648999.
5. I explain that in a significant percentage of immigrant parent termination cases,
courts and agencies support termination not because the immigrant parents are legally unfit,
but because they believe termination allows the children to have better lives. The concerns
expressed in these cases focus on the perceived economic, social, educational, and medical
inferiority of the parent’s country of origin, as well as the parents’ parenting abilities, which
were already frequently viewed as suboptimal and would arguably become even more so once
the parents returned to countries lacking the parenting support and educational services
available in the United States.
6. See infra Part I (demonstrating that significant state interests are implicated because
the children in these cases are primarily American citizens, and consequently, these
terminations implicate issues of citizenship and democracy that are of significant interest to the
state). See also James Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the Rights
of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 762–66 (2009) (noting the state’s essential
involvement in formation of all parent-child relationships).
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Consequently, although it is well established in other contexts that
fit parents have the right to the care and custody of their children,
this presumption is not appropriate when considering the rights of
undocumented, noncitizen parents. Once the parent of a child who
is an American citizen is facing deportation, the rights of the child
should be viewed as superior to those of their noncitizen parent. At
this point, the overriding concern must be ensuring that the child’s
best interests are served. In some instances, this will require
terminating the rights of fit immigrant parents.
This Article begins with a discussion of the state’s interest in
ensuring a strong and meaningful connection between children who
are American citizens and the United States. After firmly establishing
that it is in the state’s interest for children who are American citizens
to be raised in the United States, or at least exposed to an American
lifestyle, this Article will then argue why a best interest standard is
appropriate in deportation cases. It will then compare the pros and
cons of both a parental rights and a children’s rights standard and
explain why many of the assumptions underlying these standards are
inapplicable in the immigration context. In particular, this Article
argues that once a parent is facing deportation, the benefits of a best
interest standard far exceed the benefits of a parental rights standard.
Accordingly, I suggest that a shifting standard should apply.
Specifically, I argue that courts should apply a parental rights
standard when deportation is an unlikely possibility and that a best
interest standard should be used when deportation is probable. I
argue that this shifting standard is both desirable and workable as
long as the shift between standards is based on a clear triggering
event, which in these cases would be the parent(s)’ likely
deportation. After explaining this framework, I provide two examples
demonstrating that this compromise between parental rights and
children’s rights is neither novel nor overly complicated. Lastly,
although I ultimately conclude that a best interest standard should
replace the traditional fitness standard when parents are facing
deportation, I also suggest that even under this standard, the
separation of immigrant children from their biological parents should
be rare. In most cases, an examination of the facts will reveal that
termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of immigrant
children.
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I. THE STATE’S INTEREST IN IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
Encarnacion Bail Romero is an undocumented immigrant
mother who was arrested in a workplace raid for the use of false
identification. While Bail was in prison for a crime that the Supreme
Court would later determine is not a criminal offense,7 her son
Carlos was placed in the care of Seth and Melinda Moser.8 The
Mosers soon fell in love with Carlos and wanted to adopt him. Bail
vehemently objected to this adoption.9 Nevertheless, despite her
desire to resume custody of Carlos, her two years in prison took their
toll on her relationship with Carlos. During her incarceration, Bail
had no contact with Carlos and as a result, her son now considers the
Mosers his mom and dad. In addition, Carlos is settled in his new
home, he speaks only English, and he even goes by a different name,
Jamison. These and similar facts convinced the trial court that it was
in Carlos/Jamison’s best interest to remain with the Mosers, and the
court terminated Bail’s parental rights.10
The trial court’s decision was a shocking violation of Bail’s
parental rights. However, it may have been the right decision for her
son. Discussion of this case has tended to focus on this clash between
parental rights and children’s rights.11 Under current law, fit parents
have a constitutional right to the care and custody of their children.12
7. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) (striking down the law
criminalizing aggravated identity theft because according to the Supreme Court, there must be
intent). Consequently, this means Bail Romero was separated from her child for committing a
crime that was never a crime.
8. Mariano Castillo, Heart-Wrenching Fight for Immigrant’s Son, CNN.COM, (Dec.
20, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-20/us/missouri.immigrant.child_1_biologicalmother-adoptive-parents-illegal-immigrant?_s=PM:US.
9. Id.
10. Id. See also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 803–
04 (Mo. 2011) (discussing the factual background and trial court’s decision).
11. See In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 824 (describing this case as a
“travesty in . . . its long duration, and its impact on Mother, Adoptive Parents, and, most
importantly, Child”). For similar discussions of pitting parental rights against children’s rights,
see Missouri Supreme Court Must Reunite Child with Immigrant Mother, STLTODAY.COM
(Nov. 15, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/ columns/theplatform/article_b0ae81d6-f10c-11df-95d9-00127992bc8b.html? (noting the “curious” lack
of discussion of Bail’s parental rights, as if she were a nonperson); Stephen Bilkis, Messy
Adoption Could see Child Returned to Mother, NEW YORK FAMILY LAW BLOG (Feb. 5, 2011),
http://www.newyorkfamilylawblog.com/2011/02/messy_adoption_could_see_child.html
(describing this as a case about the best interests of the child and lamenting the fact that the
mother might have the child returned for “political” reasons).
12. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that the “interest of
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This standard is commonly referred to as the parental rights
standard, and it should have been used in the Bail Romero case.
Under this standard, the court would have had a very difficult time
justifying the termination of Bail’s parental rights. But instead of
employing a parental rights standard, the court used a best-interestof-the-child standard.13 Consequently, the court found termination
was appropriate because the court concluded it was in the child’s
best interest to remain with the Mosers. Similarly, on appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court substantially validated the trial court’s
decision.14 The supreme court ignored evidence of the mother’s
repeated and thwarted attempts to maintain a relationship with her
son, which the court determined was not properly in the record, and
thus agreed with the trial court’s dubious conclusion that Bail had
abandoned her child and that adoption was in his best interest.15
The fight over Carlos/Jamison sharply illustrates the difference
between a parental rights standard and a children’s rights standard.
However, it is wrong to view this case solely as a conflict between
children’s and parents’ rights. Carlos/Jamison is an American
citizen. His mother is not, and she will be deported.16 Thus, if Bail is
permitted to resume custody, Carlos/Jamison will return with her to
Guatemala. Allowing such a departure is not in the state’s interest.17
If reunification is not in Carlos/Jamison’s interest, then the State has
the right and perhaps the obligation to prevent it. In reunification
cases involving parents facing deportation, the rights of children who

parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982) (describing this right as “a fundamental liberty interest”); Smith v. OFFER, 431
U.S. 816 (1977) (refusing to grant constitutional protections to foster parents that would
infringe on the constitutional right of parents to the care and custody of their children).
13. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 828 (Stith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (concluding that there was no basis for the finding of abandonment).
14. Id. at 816 (majority opinion) (noting that although the Missouri Supreme Court
reversed the termination decision it remanded rather than order reunification based on its
conclusion that the trial court had offered “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” to support
its finding of abandonment).
15. Id. at 828 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the
substantial evidence disproving abandonment).
16. Bail’s deportation has been stayed pending her appeal, but there has been no
cancellation of removal order entered. Once the case is over, she will be deported. See id.
17. See infra Part I.A–D (discussing the state’s interest in having American citizens
raised in America and exposed to the ideas of liberalism).

1145

DO NOT DELETE

10/15/2011 1:57 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

are American citizens should outweigh the rights of their noncitizen
parents.
A. The State’s Role as Parens Patriae
Most children involved in immigrant parental rights termination
cases are, or have the ability to become, American citizens.18
Therefore, the state has a particular interest in their well-being.19 The
state’s interest in the health and future of American children has
often been held to trump parental rights. The Supreme Court clearly
articulated this idea in Prince v. Massachusetts.20 Prince involved a
mother who was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and who had
permitted her daughter to sell religious pamphlets and proselytize on
city streets at night.21 The mother was charged with violating
Massachusetts’s child labor laws.22 The Court articulated two reasons
for upholding the State’s prosecution. First, the Court found that
despite the Court’s previous decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska23 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,24 which recognized the rights of parents to
control the care and upbringing of their children, these rights did
not include the right to place one’s child in danger.25 Second, the
Court explained that even in the absence of potential danger, the
family may be regulated when such regulation is in the public
interest.26 The Prince Court stated that:
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest
. . . [a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are
beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s
well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s

18. See Zug, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that many of these children are American
citizens due to birth in the United States but that others have the ability to become citizens
based on their dependent status resulting from the termination of their parents’ parental
rights).
19. See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY,
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 8 (2006) (“[G]overnment properly takes an interest in
families in light of the goods associated with families, the functions that families serve and the
political values at stake in the institution of the family.”).
20. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
21. Id. at 159–60.
22. Id. at 160.
23. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
25. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165–66.
26. Id. at 166–67, 170.
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control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
the child’s labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not
nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the
child’s course on religion or conscience. . . . [T]he state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child’s welfare; and this includes, to some
extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.27

As the Court’s statement shows, the state’s interest in protecting
children is much more than simply guarding them from physical
harm. The state has a broad and substantial interest in the welfare of
its children, and this interest justifies even a significant infringement
of parental rights.28 Some of the clearest examples of such protection
are laws guaranteeing access to education and freedom from child
labor.29 These laws are intended to ensure that children are exposed
to the ideas deemed essential for their future well-being as well as the
well-being of the state.
B. The State’s Interest in Teaching Children the Fundamental Values
of a Democratic Society
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that children’s education
is essential to the future of the state and that it is through education
that the state creates a future generation capable of independent,
autonomous thinking with the moral capacity for self-government.30
For example, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,31 which
concerned a student who was suspended for presenting an innuendofilled speech before his high school classmates, the Court upheld the
suspension based in part on the idea that school is the place where
children learn the rules and values essential for “citizenship in the
Republic.”32 According to the Bethel Court, it is the role of public
education to instill in children “the habits and manners of civility as
values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to
the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.”33
27. Id. at 166–67 (citations omitted).
28. It should be noted that children’s interests may also be subordinated to the state’s
parens patriae interests. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
29. See infra note 118.
30. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 178–81, 331–34 (1993).
31. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
32. Id. at 681.
33. Id. (citing C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
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In Ambach v. Norwick,34 the Court expressed similar sentiments,
describing public schools as an “‘assimilative force’” that bring
together “diverse and conflicting elements” in our society “on a
broad but common ground.”35 Both cases demonstrate the Court’s
acknowledgement that one of the most important purposes of
American education is to ensure that American children receive the
values and skills necessary for productive citizenship. Moreover, these
cases show that the state’s interest in promoting these skills and
values outweighs even strong parental objections.36
One of the most telling education cases is Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education.37 This case forcefully demonstrates that
the state’s interest in the welfare of its children includes exposing
them to the ideas and values necessary to prepare them for their role
as future citizens. In Mozert, a group of religious parents objected to
reading materials assigned to their children and sued the Tennessee
School District. The parents objected to readings on secular
humanism, pacifism, and magic that the parents felt contradicted
their own religious views. They sought to have the readings include
statements indicating that the views expressed in the readings were
incorrect and that the beliefs held by the plaintiff parents were the
correct ones.38 The Sixth Circuit rejected the parents’ claims. The
court believed that supporting parental rights in this instance would
be harmful, not only to the affected children, but also to the state.39
It recognized that the claimed parental rights would keep the
students from achieving the intellectual and social skills necessary for
their future role as productive citizens.40 Moreover, as Professor

228 (1968)).
34. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
35. Id. at 77.
36. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (rejecting
a compulsory flag salute but not questioning the appropriateness of the state’s authority to
foster the ends of “national unity” and patriotism by “persuasion and example”); MCCLAIN,
supra note 19, at 70 (“[F]amilies and schools are complementary, or compensatory, domains
of moral learning: thus, even if families do not cultivate some qualities that enable good
citizenship, schools may do so.”).
37. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
38. Id. at 1060–61.
39. Id. at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Teaching students about complex and
controversial social and moral issues is just as essential for preparing public school students for
citizenship and self-government as inculcating the students to the habits and manners of
civility.”).
40. Id.; see also Steven J. Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The
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Steven Macias has written, the Mozert court recognized just how
dangerous this could be. According to Macias,
an increase in parochialism and an increase in diversity of views
[such as that desired by the Mozert parents] [is] a sure recipe for
social, cultural, and political strife as children become full citizens,
expected to interact with others to govern a society foreign to them
because of their narrow upbringing.41

Macias then argues that:
If liberty is valued and its continuance as a political and moral
principle is desired, then the sovereign must be permitted to carry
out its prerogative that its future citizens (and future sovereigns
where a democracy is concerned) are reared in a liberal tradition. It
would be a perverse result if parents were able to thwart future
liberty by the exercise of their current liberty.42

In short, the Mozert court understood that the health and future of
the liberal state depends on the exposure of future citizens to the
liberal tradition.43
Mozert primarily concerned the importance of public education
in ensuring children are exposed to the ideas necessary for their
effective participation as future citizens. However, Mozert also shows
how mere presence in the United States ensures one’s contact with
these ideas. The parents in Mozert rejected the value of any views
other than their own and wished to prevent their children’s exposure
to these ideas. However, despite rejecting these liberal ideas, the
parents were nevertheless quite skilled at employing them to their
benefit. For example, although the parents objected to the tenets of
secular humanism, they brought their case on the principles of
freedom of religion and parental rights, both of which align with
secular humanist views regarding separation of church and state and

Origins of Family Privacy, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 133–35 (2010) (explaining that this is
“keeping a segment of its society mentally enslaved from exercising the free and rational choice
. . . to one educated in a liberal polity.”).
41. Macias, supra note 40, at 133.
42. Id. at 141.
43. It should be noted that this holding is lessened by the fact that students are
permitted to attend religious schools or home schools, neither of which have a State-dictated
curriculum. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063. This, however, is uncommon because “many states
require parents to cover certain material, or to file reports with some state or local agency.”
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 97
(2004).
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independence from government control. It is clear, therefore, that
regardless of whether the parents agreed with these views, they
nevertheless understood these ideas and were able to employ them
effectively.44 Consequently, the irony is that even if the Mozert
parents had been successful, their very act of opposition would have
ensured their children’s exposure to the ideas they were rejecting.
Mozert thus demonstrates that within the United States the ideas of
liberalism are pervasive and exposure is all but assured.45 At the same
time, Mozert also highlights the problem of citizen children living
outside the United States. For these children, the exposure to such
fundamental values through either formal or informal training is
much less likely.46 From the State’s perspective this is deeply
concerning.
C. The State’s Interest in Keeping American Children Connected to
America
Mozert shows that the state’s interest in the welfare of its children
includes ensuring that children experience certain fundamental ideas
and values. It also shows that residency within the United States
practically ensures exposure to these principles. Mozert did not
44. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062 (noting that the parents won at the district court
level).
45. See MCCLAIN, supra note 19, at 17 (“[D]eliberating with fellow citizens about the
common good and helping to shape the central destiny of the political community is a central
value within the civic republican strand of the American constitutional and political tradition.”)
(citations omitted).
46. It is well documented that many of deported parents will be returning to countries
highly dissimilar from the United States. In 2008, the top ten countries of origin for
undocumented immigrants to the United States were Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Philippines, Honduras, Korea, China, Brazil, Ecuador, and India. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE
UNITED
STATES:
JANUARY
2008
(Feb.
2009),
available
at
http://
immigration.procon.org/sourcefiles/DHS2008.pdf. Of these, fewer than half are
constitutional democracies like the United States (Brazil, Honduras, India, and Mexico).
Moreover, even among those countries that are constitutional democracies, the constitutional
rights of their citizens are still frequently hampered. For example, in its summary of The State
of Democracy in Mexico, IDEA, The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, concluded that although “Mexico has taken significant steps towards free elections
and political liberties . . . Mexican citizens still face many challenges. Social and economic
inequality; high levels of corruption and inadequate governmental responsiveness; insecurity
and crime; concentration of media ownership; and low popular participation are some of the
issues that must still be dealt with effectively in order to further democracy in Mexico.” SoD
Summary—State of Democracy in Mexico, IDEA, http://www.idea.int/sod/worldwide/
summary_sod_mexico.cfm (last visited Aug. 27, 2011).
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directly connect this state interest in imparting liberal ideas with
questions of citizenship, but other cases have made this connection.
In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically upheld laws intended to
ensure that future American citizens have a significant connection to
the United States.
In Nguyen v. INS,47 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an immigration statute that automatically
conferred citizenship on foreign children born to American mothers,
but required additional steps before a biological father’s American
citizenship could be conferred onto his foreign-born child. The
assumption underlying the different treatment is that children are
more likely to have contact with their mothers than their fathers.
This contact is important for two reasons. First, this contact makes a
biological parent-child relationship much easier to verify, and
second, this contact ensures that the future citizen has a connection
to the United States. The Nguyen court explained that contact
provides the “real, everyday ties that provide a connection between
child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”48
Consequently, the Court recognized the State’s right not to confer
automatic citizenship on a child that may never have a strong
connection with the United States or an American citizen.
Reuniting immigrant children with their deported parents means
that many of these children will lack a meaningful connection with
the United States. However, unlike in Nguyen, these children’s
citizenship is not an issue. The majority of children in immigrant
parent termination cases are already citizens. Consequently, their
ability to return to the United States is guaranteed.49 From the
State’s perspective this is problematic because as Nguyen
demonstrated, citizenship without a connection to the United States
is not desirable. State interests dictate that future citizens have a
significant connection to the United States and that the welfare and
autonomy of these future citizens are protected.
Similar ideas are expressed in Professor Vivian Hamilton’s essay
on the rights of children as immature citizens. In this essay,
Hamilton discusses the State’s duty to protect the future liberty of its

47. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
48. Id. at 65.
49. The jus soli doctrine confers citizenship on those born on American soil. But see
2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 307 (proposing the elimination of jus soli in Arizona).
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citizens. She argues: “[T]he [S]tate must guard not only [children’s]
current liberty, but also their future liberty. It thus must deny all
others, including parents, the right to deprive the young either of
their basic liberty during their immaturity, or their ability to develop
the capacity to exercise their future liberty.”50 She further argues that
this interest gives the State the right to influence external factors,
such as education and environment, that children experience.51
Applying these arguments in the context of immigrant families leads
to the conclusion that the State is justified in keeping citizen children
in the United States after their parents’ deportation. In cases where
reunification with deported parents will harm a child’s future liberty,
the State has the right, and maybe even the duty, to deny others,
including parents, the ability to mandate reunification.52
D. The Other Solution
As the above discussion demonstrates, the State has a strong
interest in ensuring that future citizens have a significant connection
to the United States. As a result, this Article argues that when a
parent is facing deportation, reunification decisions should be based
on the best interests of the child and may justify terminating the
parental rights of even fit parents. I recognize, however, that this is
far from a perfect solution. Other solutions exist but seem infeasible
given the current political climate. For example, an immigration
policy that permits all parents of American citizens to remain in the
United States to care for their children would be one solution.53 If
undocumented immigrant parents did not face the possibility of
50. Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055,
1060.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1067 (arguing that the state “must . . . deny others the right to deprive
immature citizens of their abilities to develop these future capacities”).
53. Kids Sue Obama Over Parents’ Deportations, CBSNEWS (June 17, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/17/national/main5093820.shtml. Such an
approach was recently pursued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of
Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi. The court had to determine whether the fact that a
child is a citizen of the European Union confers a right to residence and a right to work upon
his or her noncitizen parents. The parents argued that their deportation was a violation of the
child’s citizenship rights and the court agreed, holding that in order for the child to have
“genuine enjoyment of these [citizenship] rights” his parents must be allowed to live and work
in the same country as their child. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office National de L’emploi,
not yet reported, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (enter
“C-34/09” in “Case number” field, and click on “Submit”).
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deportation, many of the arguments in favor of the children’s rights
approach would evaporate. A solution at the other extreme would be
to eliminate the jus soli doctrine. Jus soli confers automatic
citizenship on all persons born on United States soil. It is due to jus
soli that so many immigrant children have citizenship despite their
parents’ undocumented status. Elimination of jus soli would remove
these children’s ability to remain in the United States and thus
eliminate the questions regarding whether they should be reunited
with deported parents. Without jus soli, in most instances, children of
undocumented immigrants would be deported alongside their
parents and the State’s interest in these children after deportation
would terminate.54
Both of these suggestions would eliminate the problem of family
separations due to deportation but neither is a likely solution.
Therefore, the question of how to deal with the citizen children of
deported parents remains and requires a different solution than
nonimmigrant termination cases. This Article will argue that once a
parent has been deported, the question of reunification or
termination should be decided under a children’s rights standard. In
other words, children of deported parents should have the right to
prevent reunification.
II. PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. What Are Parental Rights and Where Do They Come From?
Defined simply, parental rights are the rights of parents to
control and make decisions for their children; it is well established
that parents have this right.55 What is less clear is whether elevating
parental rights over children’s rights is correct. Scholars such as
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse56 and James Dwyer57 have argued
against a preference for parental rights. Others such as Martin

54. The doctrine of jus soli is currently under attack by anti-immigrant groups who
believe it provides an unjustified loophole in America’s efforts to stem undocumented
immigration. Such fears have been recently exacerbated by recent stories purporting to
demonstrate the growth of the maternity tourism industry. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Arriving
as Pregnant Tourists, Leaving with American Babies, N.Y TIMES, March 29, 2011, at A1.
55. See supra note 12 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court cases establishing and
upholding this right). See also Zug, supra note 4, at 20–21.
56. See infra notes 965–998 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 6.
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Guggenheim have defended this preference.58 However, this “eitheror” approach may be unnecessary. Parental rights are preferable in
many, maybe even most circumstances, but there is little question
that in some circumstances a children’s rights standard may be
better. Consequently, even if a parental rights standard is appropriate
in most situations, this still does not justify its universal application.
When considering the interests of citizen children and their
noncitizen parents, the benefits of the parental rights standard are
outweighed by the benefits of using a children’s rights standard. An
examination of the origins of parental rights will reveal why the
benefits of this standard are diminished in the immigration context.
1. The origin of parental rights
Philosophers such as Rousseau and Locke posited that parental
rights are natural rights that exist outside of, or presuppose, manmade law. Under this natural law theory, parental rights are Godgiven and the State has no authority to interfere in the regulation of
the family.59 The natural right of parents to raise their children is a
common starting point for the discussion of parental rights.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court adopted
this reasoning as part of the basis for its decision in Meyer v.
Nebraska,60 the first Supreme Court case to articulate the idea of
parental rights.61
58. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
59. Jean Jacques Rousseau articulated a form of this idea in a work in which he argued
that the modern state is created by an implied contract between individuals and the state but
that certain aspects of an individual’s freedom are not part of this contract and thus remain
outside of government regulation. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (1979); see also John Locke, The Second Treatise of
Government, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 294 (1979) (describing the rights of
parents to raise children as one of the many natural rights of men and women). But see Dwyer,
supra note 6, at 764 (arguing that it is not obvious that the state must recognize the rights of
biological parents and noting that historically certain biological parents such as unwed fathers
were not afforded any rights).
60. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
61. Meyer and its companion case Pierce v. Society of Sisters have come to stand for the
constitutionally protected right to private decision making regarding family concerns. Macias,
supra note 40, at 92. It should also be noted that these ideas have been repeatedly reaffirmed.
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (finding the rights of parents outweigh
the rights of third parties seeking visitation with their children); Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (finding that because foster
parents were not “parents” they had no right to object to the removal of the foster children in
their care).
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The Meyer case arose as a challenge to a Nebraska state law
forbidding children who had not yet entered eighth grade from
receiving foreign language instruction.62 The purpose of the law was
to achieve the homogenization of American children by ensuring
that they would all speak a common language.63 Proponents of the
bill believed that poor English ability was a serious hindrance to the
future success of immigrant children.64 Consequently, the law’s
defenders assumed that they were representing the interests of the
children. The opponents of the law were the children’s parents who
claimed the right to make educational decisions for their children. In
striking down the state regulation, the Meyer Court held that the
right of parents to make decisions regarding their children’s care was
a natural right,65 and also that it was a right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.66 In rejecting the
State’s position, Justice McReynolds analogized the Nebraska law to
Plato’s vision of the Ideal Commonwealth in which “no parent is to
know his own child, nor any child his parent.”67 In Plato’s vision, all
children would be children of the State. McReynolds stated that
“[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men
of great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual
and state were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest . . . .”68 The Court thus rejected the idea that the
state should have a significant role in childrearing.69
Shortly after Meyer, the Supreme Court decided Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,70 which reaffirmed and elaborated on the constitutional
basis for the Meyer Court’s decision.71 In Pierce, the Court struck
down an Oregon law that required parents to send their children to

62. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397–99.
63. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 25 (2005).
64. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398.
65. Id. at 399.
66. Id. at 403.
67. Id. at 401–02.
68. Id. at 402.
69. Id.
70. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
71. These cases may be viewed as companion cases; the Meyer Court was well aware of
the fact that they would shortly be deciding Pierce. See Macias, supra note 40, at 117 (“Since
McReynolds wrote Meyer looking ahead to Pierce, it is not surprising that the earlier decision is
richer in content, in terms of laying out a foundational view of the parent-child and familystate relationships.”).
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public school.72 The Court found that this regulation
unconstitutionally and “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”73 Again, as in Meyer, the Court
emphasized the importance of recognizing and protecting parental
rights. The Court explained that “[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.”74
The Meyer and Pierce cases provide the foundation for the
current parental rights doctrine. These cases were the first to
articulate the idea that a right to private decision making concerning
family matters is inherent in the concept of liberty.75 In the decades
since these cases were decided, the idea of parental rights has become
firmly ensconced in our constitutional jurisprudence.
B. The Case for Parental Rights
The parental rights doctrine gives parents the right to control the
care and upbringing of their children, and benefits parents by freeing
them from concerns of intrusive State oversight and secondguessing. The doctrine protects parents from the fear that one bad
parental decision could deprive them of their children in favor of
someone the State believes could perform the parental role better.
The doctrine ensures that absent exceptional circumstances, parental
decisions, good or bad, will be respected and parental custody
protected. For these reasons, the doctrine of parental rights
unquestionably benefits parents. However, as the Meyer and Pierce
cases demonstrate, the argument in support of parental rights is not
simply that it protects and benefits parents. The parental rights
doctrine is also premised on the belief that it also benefits children
and the State.

72. 268 U.S. at 530–31.
73. Id. at 534–35.
74. Id. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children. . . .”).
75. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 796 (5th ed.
1995).
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1. Parental rights benefit children
The argument that parental rights benefit children is based on a
number of assumptions.76 First is the assumption that parents are
naturally more inclined than nonparents to act in the best interests of
their children.77 Under this theory, strong parental rights benefit
children because biological parents are the individuals most inclined
to make decisions benefiting their children. Second, the doctrine
benefits children because it assumes that children prefer to be with
their biological parents.78 Lastly, this doctrine is believed to benefit
children by making government intrusion into the family difficult
and therefore providing children with a stable and secure family
unit.79 Referring to the later two points, Professor Guggenheim
explains that the parental rights doctrine benefits children because it
lets “[c]hildren know that they always will be connected—
emotionally, socially, and through physical custody—to their parents
and that their relationship will not lightly be destroyed.”80
2. Parental rights benefit the state
In addition to benefitting parents and children, there is a
compelling argument that a strong parental rights standard benefits
the state by protecting the relationship between the child, as a citizen
and future contributor to society, and the state. According to
parental rights advocates, parental rights are essential to ensuring the
freedom from state control necessary for the development of the
76. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience,
and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.”).
77. John Locke wrote that the “affection and tenderness which God hath planted in the
breasts of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a
severe, arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their
offspring.” Locke, supra note 59, at 85.
78. As demonstrated by the fact that a significant number of children that were adopted
have sought to find their birth parents, it can be assumed that everything else being equal,
children would prefer to be raised by their birth parents. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 36.
79. The idea here is that this doctrine frees children from having to worry about the
government removing them from their parents’ care. Id. Although neither of these
assumptions has been proven with empirical evidence, parental rights advocates such as Martin
Guggenheim conclude that “it remains a reasonable hypothesis that, all things being equal,
children are well served by a rule that presumes their birth parents ought to raise them.” Id.
80. Id. at 37.
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next generation of independent and freethinking citizens.81 In his
analysis of Meyer and Pierce, Professor Robert Post exemplifies this
idea by positing that these cases safeguarded the democratic state by
“extending ‘fundamental rights’ to the kinds of cultural practices
deemed necessary to sustain the individuality presupposed by
democracy.”82 According to Professor Eichner, Meyer and Pierce
established the principle of limited State involvement in family
matters and, because they created a zone of privacy protected from
government intrusion, he views these cases as integral to the
protection and continuation of our liberal democracy.83 Professors
Eichner and Post are not alone. The importance of independence
from government control has long been considered an integral
aspect of a liberal democracy.
One of the foundational beliefs of liberal theory since the
writings of John Stuart Mill is the idea of a separate sphere of privacy
that must be protected from government interference.84 Liberal
theory views this cordoning off of the physical, personal, and
intimate lives of individuals from State intrusion as the best way of
promoting personal freedom and autonomy.85 It proposes that
within this sphere of privacy, individuals should be permitted to act
as they wish as long as they cause no harm to others.86 It is this idea
that led not only to the doctrine of parental rights but to the
recognition of many of the fundamental rights we now take for
granted.87 Without Meyer and Pierce, there would be no Griswold or
Lawrence.88

81. Id.
82. Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court
Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1534 (1998).
83. Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children’s Education?: Parents, Children, and
the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2007) (“[T]he United States is not merely a
democracy, it is a liberal democracy, whose commitment to majoritarian rule is tempered by
the understanding that some personal rights and liberties should not be subject to the
majority’s preferences.”).
84. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (W. W. Norton & Co. 1975)
(1859) (discussing the broad view of individual autonomy central to libertarian theory).
85. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 750–51 (1989).
86. See MILL, supra note 84, at 26 (discussing the “no harm” principle).
87. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, is the first case recognizing a constitutional right to privacy.
The Griswold court made this ruling within the context of contraceptive use in the marital
relationship. However, over time the right has been significantly expanded. Lawrence, 539
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The parental rights doctrine prevents government intrusion into
private family matters and thus requires childrearing decisions to be
left in the hands of parents.89 Consequently, the doctrine denies the
government a significant means of shaping and controlling the ideas,
interests, and values of its future citizens.90 By preventing such
governmental intrusion, the doctrine of parental rights ensures that
the role of the government is to serve the will of the people. As the
Supreme Court has stated, values, morality, and religion are things
“the [S]tate can neither supply nor hinder.”91 Parental rights
supporters hold that the doctrine of parental rights benefits the state
by helping to guarantee the independence and free thought of future
generations of American citizens.92
3. The problems with parental rights
Despite the many benefits of the parental rights doctrine, the
doctrine also has significant drawbacks. The most obvious problem
with parental rights is that they are almost by definition an
infringement on children’s rights. At its most basic level, parental
rights are the rights of parents to control and make decisions
regarding their children.93 The only significant exception to this
otherwise vast power is when parents are so unfit that their actions

U.S. 558, is the most recent case concerning and expanding the right to privacy. The Lawrence
Court held that this right extends to all private sexual conduct between consenting adults.
89. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 27 (arguing that the legal system’s insistence on
private ordering of familial life ultimately guards against state control of its citizens).
90. MCCLAIN, supra note 19, at 3 (“[F]amilies have a place in the project of forming
persons into capable, responsible, self-governing citizens”); RAWLS, supra note 30, at 43
(arguing that families are essential in “establishing a social world within which alone we can
develop with care, nurture, and education, and no little good fortune, into free and equal
citizens”).
91. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
92. Joseph Raz, Liberty and Trust, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 113
(Robert P. George ed., 1996) (explaining that government should “stand back and let people
have the choice as to how to conduct their own lives” but also arguing that the government
“must take active steps, where needed, to ensure that people enjoy the basic capacities (physical
and mental) and have the resources to avail themselves of an adequate range of options
available in their society”); see also MCCLAIN, supra note 19, at 20 (noting that the family role
serves as “a check on governmental power”).
93. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).
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endanger the life or health of their children.94 Outside of that
extreme situation, the parental rights doctrine gives parents the
freedom to act in ways that are indifferent or even harmful to the
interests of their children. It should therefore come as little surprise
that the Court that decided Meyer and Pierce and established the
constitutional doctrine of parental rights was the same Court that
repeatedly struck down Progressive reforms such as child labor
restrictions, mandatory free public schooling, and maternal and
infant health programs.95 The doctrine of parental rights assumes
that parental rights benefit children, but it contains no requirement
that such benefits actually occur. Similarly, the assumption that
parental rights benefit the state by assuring the autonomy and
privacy needed to raise independent-thinking future citizens is also
not guaranteed. This independence can just as easily allow parents to
raise their children with beliefs that undermine and threaten liberal
values.
4. Parental rights as a danger to children
In her compelling attack on parental rights, Professor Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse describes parental rights as akin to property
rights. She notes that through the doctrine of parental rights, courts
gave “primacy to the parents’ natural rights of possession. The
child’s ‘best interests’ served as a tie-breaker in disputes between
parents,” but was ignored if the dispute was between a parent and a
third party, even if that person was “a relative who had raised the
child from infancy.”96 Moreover, Woodhouse argued that even when
children are not considered property themselves, their best interests
94. Of course, there are specific laws that infringe on this right to an extent, such as
mandatory school laws and child labor laws. However, even these give parents significant
leeway in how they will be enforced. For example, homeschooling is permissible, as are certain
types of employment, most notably work on a family farm. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1) (2006) (“[P]rovisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor
shall not apply to any employee employed in agriculture outside of school hours . . . if such
employee—is less than twelve years of age and (i) is employed by his parent, or . . . (ii) is
employed, with the consent of his parent . . . .”).
95. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights:
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1,
27 (1999).
96. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1048 (1992) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Who
Owns the Child]. In addition, as Woodhouse notes, this “stranger” is often a person or a
relative who has raised the child from infancy. Id.
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are often defined in relation to property.97 By comparing parental
rights to a property right over children, Woodhouse forcefully calls
into question the assumption that parental rights benefit children.98
Even if parental rights may occasionally or even routinely have
ancillary benefits for children, the doctrine of parental rights begins
to look suspiciously like the right of parents to do what is best for
the parents with no more than the hope that such decisions will
benefit the children as well.99 The Supreme Court case of Wisconsin
v. Yoder highlights this concern.100
The issue in Yoder was whether Amish parents could exempt
their children from Wisconsin’s compulsory education statute and
remove their children from school after the completion of eighth
grade.101 The parents wanted their children to remain members of
the Amish community and feared that additional years of schooling
would leave the children inadequately prepared to assume life as part
of the Amish community. The Court ruled for the parents based on
the doctrine of parental rights.102 However, as the dissent pointed
out, this ruling all but guaranteed that the children would have no
choice but to remain part of the Amish community.103 According to
Justice Douglas, the Court’s decision allowed Amish parents to keep
their children “harnessed to the Amish way of life” and “forever
barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity we
have today.”104 Douglass feared that the impact of such parental
decisions could be long lasting, ominously predicting that if a child’s
“education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and
deformed.”105 It may be that given the choice, most Amish children
97. Id. at 1047 (citing Buchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986); Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981)) (finding the child’s best interests were served by placing him
with the more economically advantaged father and ignoring the fact that the father had
statutorily raped the child’s mother).
98. See infra note 121 (comparing parental rights to slavery).
99. See generally Dwyer, supra note 6 (arguing that placing newborns with parents
simply based on a biological connection may violate the newborns’ constitutional rights).
100. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
101. Id. at 207.
102. Id. at 233–34.
103. Id. at 242–45 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 245.
105. Id. at 246; see also JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
23 (1998) (arguing in the context of religious schooling that favoring the religious interests of
parents over the temporal interests of children harms the children in multiple ways. For
example, he writes: “Female students in particular appear to internalize the messages of self-
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would wish to forgo schooling and remain part of the Amish
community; however, the Yoder decision did not give this choice to
the children, it gave the decision to their parents.
The Yoder decision was bad for children, but it did not involve
bad parents. There is no reason to assume that the parents in Yoder
had anything but their children’s best interests at heart. Nevertheless,
giving this decision making power to the parents was not in their
children’s best interest. As Justice Douglas noted, the parents’
decision eliminated nearly all possible futures for these children save
the one the parents desired. It is hard to imagine that a person’s best
interest can truly be served by having their entire future dictated by
another. Yoder demonstrates how easily the children of loving
parents can be harmed by the parental rights doctrine and thus
reveals how this doctrine can have catastrophic consequences for the
children of abusive and neglectful parents. In the worst case scenario,
the doctrine’s policy of noninterference means that even in child
abuse and neglect cases, courts and agencies may initially be
reluctant to interfere and too willing to return children to unsafe
homes after they have been removed.106
5. Parental rights as a danger to liberalism
Just as the assumption that parental rights benefit children is
questionable, the assumption that parental rights benefit the state is
also vulnerable to attack. Parental rights can harm the state by
limiting children’s exposure to ideas and creating factionalism. The
doctrine of parental rights supports the privatization of families,
which can injure the state by increasing the number of different and
often extreme points of view within a society.107 Consequently, the
doctrine of parental rights can significantly harm the state. As
Professor Hamilton notes:
abnegation and the sinfulness of sex . . . . They find themselves unable as adults to act on
desires, to take control of their sexual/reproductive lives, or to leave abusive marriages.”).
106. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770–91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the child possessed an interest in a “stable, nurturing homelife” that might not
be served by reunification with the parents after having experienced abuse and separation); see
also Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (involving facts where the state’s
failure to remove a child from an abusive home led to permanent and severe brain injury);
MURRAY A. STRAUS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES:
RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 427 (1990)
(documenting that abused children are at a high risk of re-injury).
107. Macias, supra note 40, at 133.
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The liberal democratic state is its citizens. And citizens are born,
but they are also made. How its citizens come to be—whether the
educations they receive will expand or constrain their future
options, whether the values they assimilate will encourage or
dissuade their civic engagement, etc.—fundamentally concerns the
state.108

Similarly, in her book Democratic Education, Professor Amy
Gutmann raises related concerns in the context of parental rights
versus state control over education. Gutmann acknowledges that
significant state regulation over education may conflict with parental
rights. Nonetheless, she justifies such infringement by arguing that
parental rights do not include “a right of parents to insulate their
children from exposure to ways of life or thinking that conflict with
their own.”109 She further suggests that a liberal state has an
obligation to provide its citizen children with a democratic education
stating that the State must teach these “future citizens respect for
opposing points of view and ways of life,”110 and that it is illegitimate
for any person “to deprive any child of the capacities necessary for
choice among good lives.”111
Such ideas are also echoed by Professors William Galston and
Steven Macedo. In his book Liberal Purposes, Galston argues that it
is the obligation of the liberal state to teach children the skills and
values needed to live in and support our democratic society.
Consequently, he argues that “[j]ust as parents are prevented from
impeding children’s health development, they should not be able to
impede their children’s acquisition of knowledge and ‘habits that
support the polity and enable individuals to function completely in
public affairs.’”112 Similarly, Macedo argues it is the state’s duty to
make sure that all children receive a “liberal civic education,”113 and
that it is reasonable to impose some limits on parents’ control over
their children “for the sake of reasonable common efforts to insure

108. Hamilton, supra note 50, at 1058.
109. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 29 (1987).
110. Id. at 30.
111. Id. at 40.
112. Courtney Moran, How to Regulate Homeschooling: Why History Supports the Theory of
Parental Choice, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1084 (2011) (citing WILLIAM GALSTON,
LIBERAL PURPOSES 252 (1991)).
113. Steven Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of
God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHICS 468, 473–76 (1995).
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that all future citizens learn the minimal prerequisites of
citizenship.”114
The above discussion demonstrates that both the potential
benefits and pitfalls of the parental rights doctrine are substantial,
but this doctrine cannot be truly examined without a similarly close
look at its counterpoint, the doctrine of children’s rights. It is only
by examining the two that the relative merits can be assessed.
III. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
A. What Are Children’s Rights?
The concept of children’s rights does not lend itself to easy
definition.115 Such rights include the protection of children’s needs
and welfare, but can also include their right to freedoms such as
association, expression, and religion.116 Professor Kathleen Federle
has described these two different conceptions of children’s rights as
“one acknowledging the primacy of self-determination, [and] the
other emphasizing nurturance.”117 Although both types of rights are
now considered part of the term “children’s rights,” this was not
always true. The concept of children’s rights developed in two
stages. The first children’s rights movement was part of the
Progressive movement, which sought to improve the lives and
welfare of children through child labor laws, mandatory schooling,
and juvenile courts.118 The Progressives conceived of children’s rights
as rights to be protected and nurtured. In addition, the Progressive
reformers believed such protection was good not only for the
children but also for the State. They believed that children’s rights
114. Id. at 485–86.
115. Annette Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV.
L.J. 141, 151–52 (2004) (noting that “the ideas of ‘children’ and ‘rights’ are separately and
together extraordinarily complex and variable” and that the term “‘children’s rights’ is used
extraordinarily loosely and broadly”).
116. Id. at 152.
117. Kathleen Federle, Children, Curfews and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1315,
1315 (1995).
118. There have been two important children’s rights movements. GUGGENHEIM, supra
note 63, at 1. The first was led by the Progressives in the nineteenth century. Id. The
Progressive movement focused on what was good for children by proposing legislation to help
children. Id. Legislation such as the Keating-Owen Act was introduced to limit child labor.
Keating-Owen Act, 64 P.L. 249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916) (declared unconstitutional by Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)). Other Progressive reforms included common schools
and mandatory school attendance. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 2.
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benefit the state by ensuring that the basic needs of its future citizens
are taken care of and also by making sure that their intellectual and
political needs are met. According to Progressives, children’s rights
included the right to an education that would expose them to the
ideas and principles of democratic government.119
The second children’s rights movement developed in the 1960s
and focused on the rights of children as independent and
autonomous beings.120 During this period, parental control began to
be viewed as oppression,121 and treating children differently from
adults was seen as discrimination that denied children “their right to
full humanity.”122 Children’s advocates began to advance claims
based on the “child’s individual personhood” and sought to separate
“children’s interests from their parents’.”123 Due to this second
children’s rights movement, children’s rights began to include more
than the right to be protected, nurtured, and educated.124 Children’s
rights now included the right to be free from adult (usually parental)

119. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 1–2. (Noting that the children’s movement
spearheaded by the Progressive reformers was one which sought to transfrom the issue of child
well-being from “parental responsibility to an issue that government and those who forged
official policy had a responsibility to address.”).
120. Id. at 7–8.
121. Some have even compared such control to slavery. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar &
Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (likening the status of children to that of slaves); James G. Dwyer,
Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF.
L. REV. 1371, 1412–15 (1994) (comparing children to slaves and property in general);
Michael D. A. Freeman, The Limits of Children’s Rights, in THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS 29, 30 (Michael Freeman & Philip Veerman eds., 1992) (describing those who lack
rights as slaves); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s Rights”:
The Child’s Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 326 (1993–1994) (describing
the parent child relationship as similar to slavery). But see GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 9
(describing such comparisons as “overheated nonsense”).
122. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 6; see also Federle, supra note 117, at 1344
(stating that just as “the infantilization of African Americans was nothing more than an
attempt to control and oppress an entire race” that “[t]heories which cannot accommodate the
rights of children perpetuate these traditions of power and dominance”); Stephen Scales,
Intergenerational Justice and Care in Parenting, 28 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 667, 668 (2002)
(referring to the status of children in American law as a “moral nightmare” and an “evil and
morally hideous” position).
123. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 13.
124. Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, supra note 96, at 1002 (“[O]ur attachment to
[the] property-based notion of the private child cuts off a more fruitful consideration of the
rights of all children to safety, nurture, and stability, to a voice, and to membership in the
national family”).
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control that did not serve their interests or sufficiently consider their
wishes.125
As a result of these two children’s rights movements, the current
conception of children’s rights includes protection rights,126 meaning
the right to be free from harm, as well as autonomy rights, meaning
the right to make choices about one’s own life.127 However, both
aspects of children’s rights still lack the widespread acceptance
enjoyed by parental rights.128 Current U.S. law recognizes both types
of children’s rights, but only in particular contexts and to limited
degrees. For instance, a child’s right to protection can be seen in the
laws that exist to prevent child abuse and neglect, to prevent child
labor, and to require school attendance. However, there are no laws
that protect children from the dangers of selfish or uninterested
parents. Similarly, the law recognizes some autonomy rights in
children, such as minors’ rights to abortion and free expression,129
125. Id.; Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the
Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585 (1995).
126. Protection rights include the rights to be fed and sheltered. See Appell, supra note
115, at 157 (noting this type of children’s rights “predates contemporary notions of children’s
rights”). They also include the right to be protected from other types of harm such as physical
abuse or unsafe working conditions, military service, and unreasonable searches and seizures.
See Jonathan O. Hafen, Children’s Rights and Legal Representation—The Proper Roles of
Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423, 437–38
(1993).
127. Autonomy rights include rights such as those of association and expression. See
Appell, supra note 115, at 152; see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The
Constitutional Rights of Children To Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53
MD. L. REV. 358, 362, 395 (1994) (discussing children’s rights in terms of associational
rights); Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 223 (1999) (discussing children’s rights in terms of autonomy). Legal
examples of children’s autonomy rights include, for example, the right of minors to have
abortions without parental consent. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking down
a mandatory parental notification requirement); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976).
128. One example is the United States’ long opposition to ratification of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The U.S.’s objection to the convention, which
protects children from harms such as sexual exploitation and child labor, is the fear that it will
impinge on parents’ rights to raise their children as they see fit. Among other concerns,
opponents fear that the clause banning torture and other cruel and inhuman punishment could
be interpreted to ban spankings. See Brian Montopoli, 31 Senators Oppose U.N. Children’s
Rights Convention, CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2010, 6:22 p.m.), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301503544_162-20014613-503544.html.
129. There are fewer examples of such legally protected rights and even when they exist,
they are typically less robust and protected than similar rights of adults. For example, children
have many of the same constitutional rights as adults, but to a lesser degree. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly upheld these weaker constitutional protections. See Appell, supra note
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but gives children no right to make other decisions such as whether
to marry, work, or even see an R-rated movie. Children’s rights
advocates seek to increase both the protection130 and autonomy
rights131 of children. These advocates object to the weaker
protections afforded to children’s rights and reject the idea that
parental rights should trump children’s rights.
B. The Case for Children’s Rights
1. Children’s rights benefit children
As the reverend Hastings H. Hart, a well-known Progressive
reformer, stated in a 1901 speech, children’s rights should be
recognized for two reasons: “first, because the child has a natural
right to an opportunity for normal and healthy development; second
because the care of such children is essential to the preservation of
the community.”132 Hart’s first argument in favor of children’s rights
is the proposition that recognizing children’s rights is good for the
child. Although the definition of children’s rights has expanded
significantly in the century since Hart made this statement,133 the
idea that children’s rights are good for the child is still the essential
115, at 154 (“These rights follow those of adults but are extended only partially, or differently,
to children because of their minority status. These rights recognize children as persons under
the Constitution and extend due process and equal protection of the law to them, but in
limited, or even special, ways because of their minority.”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (recognizing, for the first time, children as “persons” under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
130. For example, many children’s rights advocates voice significant opposition to family
reunification policies, which they contend fail to sufficiently protect the best interests of
children sufficiently. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 110 (1999) (“The most
extreme forms of intervention work best for children. Children placed in foster homes do
better than children whose families are kept together, and children placed in adoptive homes
do better yet. They would do even better if we moved them on to adoption promptly, rather
than subjecting them to the kind of damaging delays that routinely occur in today’s system.”);
James Dwyer, Children’s Interests in a Family Context—A Cautionary Note, 39 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1053, 1067 (1999) (suggesting that parental terminations should be governed by a
best interests of the child standard).
131. See, e.g., Federle, supra note 125, at 1595.
132. Hasting H. Hart, The Child-Saving Movement, 58 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 520
(1901).
133. The definition of children’s rights now includes components focused on the
autonomy of the child. As Professor James Dwyer has argued, children’s rights theorists
recognize children as free and equal persons protected by the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. DWYER, supra note 105, at 122–28.
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basis for the children’s rights movement. Children’s rights advocates,
such as Professors Elizabeth Bartholet and James Dwyer, base their
arguments in support of children’s rights on the idea that children’s
best interests are served when children’s rights are favored over
parental rights and that children’s best interests should be protected
even at the cost of diminished parental rights.
Advocates for children’s rights cite numerous instances where
children’s interests conflict with parental interests.134 As a result,
these advocates conclude that freeing children from parental control
is essential to their welfare. They also argue that the benefits of
children’s rights are more than simply freeing children from parental
control and potentially harmful parental decision making. Children’s
rights also benefit children because this approach includes the
imposition of duties on those charged with the care of children.135
These duties, imposed on caretakers, communities, and the state
permit children to achieve their full potential by ensuring children’s
ability to develop their capacities and talents.136 Consequently,
children’s rights benefit children because they protect children from
the harm of parental control and because they impose duties on

134. Professor Bartholet has raised such concerns in the context of foster care and
termination, arguing that longer periods before termination of parental rights, while arguably
good for parents, can be disastrous for their children who must spend longer periods in foster
care limbo. See generally, BARTHOLET, supra note 130. Professor Dwyer discusses this conflict
in the context of education arguing that parental control over their children’s education can
deprive their children of the skills and knowledge that could benefit them in adulthood. See
James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the Public Into the Religious Square, 42 WM. &.
MARY L. REV 963, 966 (2001) (“Most arguments about child-rearing issues give little
attention to, and often simply ignore, the developmental interests of the children involved.
Instead they focus on the interests and rights of parents . . . . For that reason they are
deficient.”).
135. Given the dependent nature of children, children’s rights would mean little without
attendant duties to help them effectuate these rights. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995) (describing the parent as a kind of
fiduciary with responsibility for the child’s welfare but not as an actual owner of the child). See
also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1756–57 (1992) (suggesting that “[a]dults—judges,
policy makers, and parents—make wiser, more principled, and more authentic decisions for and
about children”).
136. Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights Flow Downhill, 2 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 343, 356
(1994) (discussing the goal of children’s rights as “someday, lead[ing] to a better life for
children through the articulation of ideal relationships between children and adults in the
larger community”); Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, supra note 96, at 1056 (noting that
children’s rights “were paired with duties and existed so that children might grow and learn to
do right”).
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parents and other caregivers to provide children with the help they
need to realize their potential.
2. Children’s rights benefit the state
Defenders of parental rights argue that a strong deference to
parental rights is necessary for the health and welfare of the state, but
children’s rights advocates can make a similarly compelling
argument. Such arguments were first articulated by the Progressive
reformers who argued that children should not to be treated as
property of their parents. According to the Progressives, “the child’s
highest duty was no longer obedience to parents, but preparation for
citizenship.”137 Progressive reformers believed that children required
and had the right to a certain level of exposure to ideas and
education that would enable them to become the type of
independent, autonomous citizens necessary to the continuation of
the liberal state. They believed that through mandatory public school
the State would be able “to train citizens to exercise their rights in a
democracy; to imbue immigrants and the poor with ‘American’
ideals and culture; and to equalize opportunity for advancement in
an egalitarian society.”138 Consequently, because this training was
considered essential for the health of the state, cases such as Meyer
and Pierce and the doctrine of parental rights, which permitted
parents to remove children from the common school, were
considered a serious threat.
The idea that the survival of our constitutional democracy rests
on the proper training of our future citizens was not limited to the
Progressive Movement and has been repeatedly reaffirmed. In Brown
v. Board of Education,139 the Supreme Court struck down segregated
schools as unconstitutional and explained that such schools harm
African American children in a manner that undermines “the very
foundation of good citizenship.”140 According to the Brown Court, a
denial of educational opportunities denies children the tools
necessary for their role as future citizens. The Court reiterated this
idea more recently in Grutter v. Bollinger, stating, “We have

137.
138.
139.
140.

Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, supra note 96, at 1051.
Id. at 1006.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
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repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing
students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to
‘sustaining our political and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of society.”141
C. The Problem with Children’s Rights
Discussing children’s rights as separate from parental rights can
be difficult. Children are by definition dependent. One cannot
consider the rights of children without also considering the rights of
the people on whom they are dependent, most often their parents.142
Consequently, greater children’s rights will often mean greater
governmental oversight of parental decision making, which can be
problematic. It is highly questionable whether the government will
make better decisions regarding children than parents. As Professor
Guggenheim has noted, “[a] best interests inquiry is not a neutral
investigation that leads to an obvious result. It is an intensely valueladen inquiry.”143 Given this difficulty, Guggenheim concludes that
permitting childrearing decisions to be made by parents, the people
who know the child best, rather than state officials who may never
have even met the child, is the best means of achieving a desirable
result.144
The Iowa Supreme Court case of Painter v. Bannister145 provides
a compelling example of how a concern with children’s rights and
best interests may be no more likely to effectuate a child’s best
interests than cases decided according to a doctrine of parental
rights. In Painter, a fit father lost custody of his son to the child’s
maternal grandparents because of the court’s distaste for the father’s
unconventional, arty lifestyle.146 The court’s evidence to support its
determination that paternal custody was not in the child’s best
interest were facts such as the father’s wearing of a “sport shirt and
sweater” to his wife’s funeral, his failure to paint the outside of his
house, and his preference for “uncut weeds and wild oats” rather
than a neatly trimmed lawn.147 The custody decision was a clear
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 13.
Id. at 38–39.
Id.
140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 155.
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reflection of the judges’ distaste of the father’s lifestyle and the
judges’ personal perception of the child’s best interest. The decision
was made according to a best-interest-of-the-child standard, but it is
far from clear that the court’s decision actually served the child’s best
interest.148
An additional problem with children’s rights is that too much
State involvement may actually thwart the increased autonomy that
children’s rights advocates seek to create. One of the most
compelling reasons behind the parental rights doctrine is the idea
that protecting family privacy helps foster independent, autonomous
adults who will be capable of exercising the type of free will necessary
to the continuation of the liberal state. Too much State involvement
in childrearing decisions runs the danger of homogenizing families
and preventing the necessary liberal independence.149
IV. PARENTAL RIGHTS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, AND IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN
The strongest argument favoring parental rights is that parental
rights do not just benefit parents, but they also benefit children. This
supposition is based on the premise that biological parents are best
suited to act in their children’s best interests, that children would
prefer to remain with their parents, and that parental rights ensure
stability and security for children. As discussed above, the wellestablished criticisms of a parental rights standard cast significant
doubt on these assumptions in general. However, in the context of
immigrant family reunification, the problems with the assumption
that parental rights benefit children are magnified exponentially.

148. The Iowa Supreme Court certainly felt that the trial judge’s decision granting
custody to the father had been in error and reversed. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 41
(“However alluring and child-friendly the ‘best interests’ test appears, in truth it is a formula
for unleashing state power, without any meaningful reassurance of advancing children’s
interests.”). See also Zug, supra note 4, at 16–20 (describing the personal biases that often
accompany termination decisions in the immigration context).
149. It should be noted, however, that similar concerns regarding state intrusion into
childrearing were voiced against many of the Progressive reforms that are now accepted as
correct and beneficial, such as mandatory school attendance and child labor bans. For example,
in 1924, the president of Columbia University spoke out against the child labor bills pending
in Congress, warning that they “would empower Congress to invade the rights of parents and
to shape family life to its liking.” GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 3.
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A. Parental Rights Assumptions and Separations Due to Abuse and
Neglect
Immigrant reunification cases concern the issue of whether to
reunite children with their deportable or deported parents. These
cases involve children who have already been separated from their
parents. Such separations can occur for a number of reasons.
Immigrant children may be separated from their parents due to
allegations of abuse or neglect, or simply because of their parents’
undocumented status.150 As discussed above, the parental rights
presumption that reunification is in the children’s best interest has
been subject to significant criticism. Opponents of this standard have
argued that, particularly in the context of abuse and neglect cases,
presumptions that parents act in their children’s best interest, that
children prefer to remain with their biological parents, and that
keeping biological families together provides stability and security,
are highly questionable.151 Reuniting a child with a formerly abusive
or neglectful parent is concerning in the typical case. However, in
the immigration context such concerns are amplified. Once a child is
reunited with a deported parent, there is no longer any U.S.
oversight of these families and, in fact there may be no oversight
whatsoever. Many of the countries the parents are returning to lack
institutions and services similar to American child protective services.
As a result, the dangers of unwise reunification are significantly
magnified after a parent’s deportation. Any abuse that occurs after
deportation is unlikely to ever be discovered.152
A related concern involves the limited facilities available in the
deported parents’ country of origin. Within the United States,
parents seeking reunification have the opportunity to take classes,
attend counseling, and have their children looked after by others
while they attempt to remedy the conditions that resulted in the
removal of their children. Children’s rights advocates often argue

150. In a minority of these cases, children were separated from their parents when the
parents were detained in workplace raids for other immigration violations.
151. See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 791–92 (arguing it violated the constitutional right of
newborns to be placed with parents who have a history of abusing or neglecting their
children).
152. In addition, the assumption that children would prefer to return to abusive and
neglectful parents and that a policy of reunification provides the greatest degree of stability and
security for these children is also highly suspect.
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that hopelessly unfit parents are given too many chances,153 but the
underlying idea is that with the proper help and resources, many, if
not most, of these parents can become fit. However, the glaring
problem with such assumptions in the immigration context is that
many of the parents’ countries’ of origin lack these services.
Therefore, even if a domestic violence class could solve the parents’
problems, the lack of such classes in the parents’ home countries
means that parents’ abilities to remedy the conditions that led to the
removal of their children in the first instance is non-existent. This
unfortunate reality counsels against the parental rights doctrine’s
assumption that children’s interests are protected by recognizing
parental rights. Such an assumption may make sense in countries like
the United States that have the resources and procedures in place to
catch cases of abuse and neglect, but this assumption is far too
dangerous to apply in the immigration context.154
B. Parental Rights Assumptions and Separations Due to Status
Although many immigrant children are separated from their
parents due to abuse and neglect, many other cases concern parents
who were separated from their children solely due to their
immigration status.155 These are fit parents who have been separated
from their children simply because they have the wrong immigration
status.156 However, even in these cases, which concern fit parents,
153. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 130.
154. Even in the United States, far too many of these cases go undetected. See ANDREA J.
SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL
INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 13, 15–16 (1996), available at
http://www.law.uh.edu/hjhlp/Issues/Vol_81/Kelly.pdf (estimating that there are 1,553,800
incidences of child abuse and neglect annually but child protection agencies intervened in or
investigated only 872,000 of these incidences). The likelihood that these statistics would be far
worse in many foreign countries is high.
155. In this group, I am including parents accused of abuse and neglect based simply on
their immigration status or bias against immigrants. As demonstrated in my previous article,
the bias against immigrants is significant and immigrant parents have been declared unfit based
on little more than the language they speak or their immigration status. Accordingly, a best
interest standard offers parents even less protection, making them more susceptible to antiimmigrant biases. Zug, supra note 4, at 21–24.
156. It should be noted, however, that immigration raid separations are likely to
decrease. During the Bush administration, there were a number of highly publicized workplace
raids in which parents were separated from their children due to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) detention. However, under the Obama administration, large-scale
workplace raids have diminished and ICE has instituted humanitarian release guidelines to
identify and release parents such as sole caregivers, nursing mothers, pregnant women and
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when a parent is facing deportation it weakens the parental rights
presumption that parental rights benefit children.
In the immigration context, parental and children’s interests can
easily clash.157 As Professor Bridget Carr has noted, harsh
immigration laws put parents in “impossibly difficult positions” and,
under such circumstances, it is unwise to assume that parents act in
their children’s best interest.158 However, it is important to note that
this clash is unlikely to arise prior to deportation proceedings. It is
only at the point of deportation that immigration status becomes an
issue likely to cause a rift between the parents’ interests and the
children’s. Before deportation is at issue there is no justification for
applying a different standard for immigrant families. Removing a
child based on best-interest considerations before the parent is facing
deportation is wrong.
In Separation, Deportation, Termination, I discussed numerous
instances in which child welfare services removed children from their
parents simply because their parents were undocumented
immigrants.159 Then, after this unjustified removal, the agency would

others. See Guidelines for Identifying Humanitarian Concerns among Administrative Arrestees,
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/wkplce_
enfrcmnt/ice-hum-guidelines.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). Further, in 2009, these
guidelines were expanded to include workplaces of twenty-five or more employees. Previously,
they had only applied to workplaces with 150 employees or more. See Daphne Eviatar,
Immigration Raid Rules Echo Bush Era, THE WASH. INDEP. (May 6, 2009),
http://washingtonindependent.com/
41963/immigration-raid-rules-echo-bush-era.
In
addition, other reforms, providing further protections may also become standard. See AJAY
CHAUDRY ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE
AFTERMATH
OF
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
(Feb.
2010),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412020_FacingOurFuture_
final.pdf
(suggesting
additional immigration reforms such as, detaining parents closer to home in order to facilitate
visitation with children when detention is mandatory).
157. See Bridget A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into
Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120 (2009). Professor Carr
focuses specifically on the situation where children have a different immigration status from
their parents, meaning they are eligible to remain in the United States when their parents are
not. In such circumstances, Carr notes that their interests may be far from aligned, and that
recognizing only the parents’ interests can have disastrous consequences for the child. See id. at
130–40.
158. Id. at 120 (noting that, in certain cases, parents may have to “choose between
abandoning their children in a foreign land and risking the torture of their children”).
159. See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068 (Cal. App.
Sept. 8, 2009); In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. App. 2001); In re Angelica L., 767
N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009). See generally Zug, supra note 4, at 21–27 (describing how these
termination cases were based upon the parents undocumented status).
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claim it was in the child’s interest to have their parents’ rights
terminated because the children had become attached to their foster
parents. In such cases, the welfare agencies created the conditions
that led to the court’s conclusion that termination was in the
children’s best interest. This Article is in no way endorsing such
actions. Nevertheless, once a parent is facing deportation, the
possibility of divergent interests increases significantly, and this fact
cannot be ignored.
A stark example of this potential conflict is demonstrated in the
case of Olowo v. Ashcroft.160 Olowo involved an undocumented
immigrant mother who sought derivative asylum based on the claim
that if she were deported she would have no choice but to allow her
young daughters to undergo female genital mutilation back in
Nigeria.161 The daughters, however, were legal permanent residents
and had the right to stay in the United States. Given the children’s
right to remain, the court was highly disturbed by the mother’s
intention to return to Nigeria with her daughters. The court
recognized that in this case, the mother’s interest in reunification
strongly conflicted with the best interests of her children.162 As a
result, the court contacted the Illinois department of Family Services
and the Illinois State’s Attorney for Cook County in order to prevent
reunification.163
Olowo vividly demonstrates how parents’ and children’s interests
can conflict in the immigration context and also how vulnerable
children are once they are reunited with their deported parents. As
long as the daughters remained in the United States, any attempts to
circumcise them would have been meet with criminal sanctions and
loss of custody. Within the United States, we can afford the luxury of
160. 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004).
161. Id. at 697.
162. Id. at 704 n.9. Professor Carr notes how easily the children’s interests could have
been ignored in this case. She notes that the mother’s mistake was alerting the judge to the
threat of female genital mutilation (FGM). If the mother had not raised the issue then the
daughters would not have been removed and could have returned to Nigeria with her when
she was deported, where they might have been subject to FGM. This demonstrates,
particularly in the immigration context, a significant problem with the parental rights
doctrine’s assumption that parents act in their children’s best interest. Carr, supra note 157, at
133–34.
163. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 704 (noting that it was alerting those “whose duty it is to
represent the people of the State of Illinois in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 . . . which protects minors from parents who allow acts of torture to be committed on
minors”).
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assuming parents act in their children’s best interest because
instances in which this assumption is incorrect will hopefully be
revealed and remedied through channels such as doctors, teachers,
and social workers.164 There is no such safety net when children leave
with deported parents. Although immigrant parents are no more
likely to act against their children’s interests than American parents,
the repercussions of bad parental decisions may be far greater.
Consequently, when parents facing deportation have already lost
custody of their child due to a finding of unfitness the concern that
they may act against their child’s best interests in the future is
increased. Ms. Olowo may never have truly intended to take her
daughters to Nigeria with her if deported. Perhaps she was simply
making the best case she could to gain asylum. However, there is no
way to know.
Once deported parents leave with their children, U.S. oversight
terminates. Ms. Olowo was never judged unfit prior to her asylum
application. Had she forgone her asylum application and agreed to
deportation, no one would have questioned her right to take her
daughters. What this reveals is that even in the context of “fit”
parents, the clash between parent and child interests can be
significant. Thus, when courts are considering the reunification of
children with previously judged unfit parents facing deportation,
there are particularly compelling reasons to employ a “best interests
of the child” standard.165
C. Presuming Children Want to Be with Their Biological Parents
In the immigration context, there are also strong reasons to
question the parental rights assumption that children prefer to
remain with their parents.166 Many of the immigrant parents’
countries of origin are substantially poorer and less developed than
164. See, for example, state laws such as S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-610 (requiring certain
persons to report child abuse).
165. According to John Rawls, the basic rights of children “as future citizens are
inalienable” and it is the government’s responsibility to “protect them wherever they are.”
RAWLS, supra note 30, at 471.
166. The case of Walter Polovchak, Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 732 (7th Cir.
1985), is a famous example of a child resisting return. Walter was the child of Ukrainian
immigrants who refused to return to the Soviet Union with his parents and sought political
asylum in the United States in order to remain in the United States. Walter’s parents were not
being deported. Rather, they were returning voluntarily based on their belief that the move
was in their family’s best interest. Walter, however, adamantly disagreed with this assessment.
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the United States.167 As a result, for many of these children,
reunification means being sent to a country where they will be
poorer, where they may receive little or no education, where medical
facilities are inadequate, and where sufficient food and clean water
are sporadic or unavailable. It may also mean reunification in
countries with fewer freedoms and significantly more violence.168
For example, in her work documenting indigenous Guatemalan
women detained in immigration raids, Professor Karla McKanders
describes the conditions that lead many women to leave Guatemala
and the conditions they and their children would face if returned.
She notes that in addition to extreme poverty, limited educational
opportunities, and pervasive discrimination, there is also a welldocumented and deeply rooted tradition of domestic violence which
frequently ends in death.169 In such circumstances, it is not hard to
imagine that given the choice, many children would prefer to remain
in the United States without their parents.170 Forcing children to
leave with their deported parents may not be what many children
want and could substantially undermine their future prospects.
Because it may undermine children’s future prospects, mandatory
reunification may be unconstitutional, and it is certainly not in the
children’s best interests.171

167. See, e.g., Karla McKanders, The Unspoken Voices of Indigenous Women in
Immigration Raids, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 (2010) (describing the conditions that lead
many indigenous Guatemalan women to leave).
168. Many of the mothers involved in deportation proceedings “allege that they migrated
to the United States to escape some type of domestic abuse or gendered violence that the
government was unable to control.” Id. at 33.
169. Id. at 24 (noting that “since 2000 more than 4,000 women and girls have been
murdered in Guatemala” and that few of these murders result in convictions).
170. In re Polovchak, 432 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill. App. 1981) (involving a child that ran
away from home because he did not want to return to Ukraine with his parents).
171. See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 811 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171
(2007)) (arguing that state decisions that hinder a child’s “ability to realize to realize their full
potential” may be unconstitutional); see also Polovchak, 432 N.E.2d at 877; CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT
MORE THAN EVER (2004); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (1999); T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, in DEMOCRACY:
A READER 211 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds., 2001) (describing citizenship as
entailing “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized
being according to the standards prevailing in the society”).
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D. Parental Rights Assumption Regarding Stability and Security
The doctrine of parental rights also assumes reunification
benefits children because it fosters stability and security. However,
this is often not true. Many immigrant reunification cases involve
children who have lived with foster parents for years, have little
memory of their biological parents, speak only English, and have
become accustomed to an American way of life.172 For children in
these circumstances, it is reunification that will cause significant
disruption to the stability and security of their life. For these
children, reunification would mean leaving the only home and family
they have ever known in order to go to a foreign country to live with
parents they do not remember and where they may not even speak
the language. It is not clear that reunification under such
circumstances is in a child’s best interest. The parental rights
doctrine assumes that children achieve stability and security by
remaining with their parents. However, for immigrant children who
may already have been separated from their parents for significant
amounts of time, it is their attachment to a place that may have been
providing this sense of stability and security.173 In such cases, it is life
in America that has been the only constant for these children.
Forcing them to leave to reunite with a deported parent may do
more harm than good. A children’s rights standard allows such
considerations to be taken into account.
A children’s rights approach focuses on the best interests of the
child and whether the child desires reunification. Given this focus, it
is clear that a children’s rights standard has significant benefits for
immigrant children. However, it is not obvious that children’s
interests outweigh the equally substantial interests of fit parents in
the care and custody of their children. Thus, the decisive factor
should be the state’s interests. When children’s interests are
considered in tandem with the state’s interest, this calculus changes.

172. Many of these foster parents also wish to adopt the children. See, e.g., supra notes 7–
16 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Carlos Romero).
173. In fact, a recent study published in the British Journal of Social Work indicates that
the importance of children’s attachment to a place may be just as important as their attachment
to relatives or caregivers. The article examines “the significance of children’s place attachments
for the development of their identity, security and sense of belonging” and concludes that
stability in location is of significant importance. See Gordon Jack, Place Matters: The
Significance of Place Attachments for Children’s Well-Being, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 755
(2010).
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V. IMMIGRANT REUNIFICATION DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE
UNDER A BEST INTEREST STANDARD
A. State’s and Children’s Interests Align
The state has a significant interest in keeping American
immigrant children in the United States. This interest, combined
with the children’s best interest, weighs in favor of applying a
children’s rights approach to immigrant family reunification
decisions. As the above analysis demonstrates, both the State’s and
children’s interests indicate that immigrant reunification and
termination decisions should be decided according to a best-interestof-the-child analysis. As Professor Emily Buss has written, “Where
the child’s views align with either the parents’ or the state’s, the
child’s position should have special developmental force.”174 It
should also be noted that regardless of the state’s specific interest in
raising future American citizens, the state should be inclined to favor
children’s interests over the parents’ simply because the children are
citizens and the parents are not. Between the interests of citizens and
noncitizens, the state’s interests, in most instances, should favor the
citizen.175
Congress’s plenary power over immigration means that Congress
has the power to treat noncitizens differently than citizens.176

174. Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 44 (2004) [hereinafter Buss, Allocating Developmental Control]
(“A state’s interest in having a child receive a certain form or extent of education, however
strong in the abstract, becomes stronger when aligned with the expressed interest of the child
in pursuing that education. Conversely, a parent’s interest in avoiding that education becomes
stronger if aligned with the child’s interest in avoiding it. This is not simple math and tiebreaking. Rather, it recognizes that the interests at stake, and related expertise, in fact change
with the alignments. The state is in a far better position to assess, and meet, the educational
needs of a child aspiring to leave her parent’s community and join mainstream society and the
national economy, than to assess and meet the needs of a child who aspires to live apart.
Similarly, the child’s common interest in a certain form of upbringing can serve to legitimize
the parents’ authority as the best (and most competent) assessor of the child’s developing
needs.”).
175. But see Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980,
Hague XXVIII at 13 (requiring US courts to cede custody jurisdiction over US citizen
children to a foreign court if the child was wrongly removed).
176. In practice, what this plenary power means is that noncitizens denied entry at the
border have virtually no due process rights. See Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process . . . .”). Even
long-term residents have fewer constitutional protections. “Scholars and courts alike have long
noted, and often decried, the constitutional exceptionalism of the immigration power within
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Noncitizens have constitutional rights, but they have repeatedly been
found to be more limited than the rights of citizens.177
Consequently, preferring state interests and citizen children’s
interests over that of their foreign parents is justified even if this
choice would not be supportable with regard to citizen parents.178
When considering the reunification of citizen children with deported
or deportable parents, a best interest standard must apply.
B. A Best Interest Standard Does Not Automatically Require
Separation
In addition to the arguments presented above, a best-interest-ofthe-child approach is desirable because in most cases it will not result
in the termination of parental rights. In the majority of cases, an
evaluation of the child’s best interest will demonstrate that the child
would be best served by reunification with his or her parents. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Santosky v. Kramer, “Even when a
child’s natural home is imperfect, permanent removal from that
home will not necessarily improve his welfare.”179 The Santosky
Court recognized that “termination of parental rights [does not]
necessarily ensure adoption,” and “even when a child eventually
finds an adoptive family, he may spend years moving between State

American public law.” PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS
CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998) (using the terms legal “maverick” and “wild
card” to characterize immigration law); Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion:
Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2010); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1704 (1992)
(remarking on the “singularity” of immigration).Given the fact that Congress is not
significantly constrained by the Constitution with regard to immigration policy, it is possible
that an intentional congressional policy of separation could be constitutional. For example,
since many of these cases involve American citizens, Congress could find that the benefits of an
American education, English, and other opportunities available to all citizens could justify
keeping these children in America regardless of whether their parents were considered unfit.
177. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
178. As the 11th Circuit stated in United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1025 (11th
Cir. 2001), “Congress can pass laws regulating the conduct of noncitizens within the United
States, and those laws do not violate equal protection so long as they are rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.” The health and welfare of children and future citizens would
certainly meet this low standard. See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (noting
that decisions made by Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization
are subject to “a narrow standard of review” equivalent to rational-basis scrutiny).
179. 455 U.S. 745, 765 n.15 (1982).
ON IMMIGRATION AND
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institutions and ‘temporary’ foster placements after his ties to his
natural parents have been severed.”180
For many children, termination will not result in a better life.
Instead, it will lead to a childhood in foster care and all its attendant
problems. A best-interest-of-the-child standard does not require this
result. It ensures that the children’s interests are truly considered. It
means that children old enough to express their desire to remain in
the United States will likely be able to do so.181 It also means that
children too young to make such an evaluation will still have their
best interests, rather than their parents’ interests, considered. In
addition, it means that the State’s interest in the welfare of its
citizens does not end at the borders. At the same time, it does not
mean that immigrant parents will automatically or even routinely
lose custody of their children upon deportation. Under this
approach, immigrant parents will only have their rights terminated
when termination is in their child’s best interests, and most of the
time termination will not be. Rarely will better resources or
opportunities be enough, by themselves, to overcome the benefits of
remaining with a loving and caring parent.
VI. A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK
Children’s rights and parental rights are traditionally viewed in
opposition to one another,182 and the debate between the two
180. Id.
181. See generally Leslie A. Fithian, Forcible Repatriation of Minors: The Competing Rights
of Parents and Child, 37 STAN. L. REV. 187 (discussing cases in which children wished to
remain in the United States against their parents’ wishes).
182. See DWYER, supra note 105 (discussing the conflict between parental rights and
children’s rights in the context of religious schooling); Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer,
Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 66 (discussing this either-or dichotomy in the context of
adoption and stating that “the replacement of traditional parent-focused standards for court
intervention by a purportedly child-focused standard would represent a disturbing erosion of
critical due process protections that serve the interests of both parents and children”); David J.
Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights
Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L.
REV. 139 (1992); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637,
638–40 (2006) (“[T]he debate between advocates of parents’ rights and children’s rights is
charged and polarized.”); Orly Rachmilovitz, Achieving Due Process Through Comprehensive
Care for Mentally Disabled Parents: A Less Restrictive Alternative to Family Separation, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 785, 824 (2010) (noting that traditionally, at least on the context of abuse
and neglect, “parents’ rights and children’s rights were considered in opposition to each
other”).
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positions does not lend itself to an easy resolution.183 Both children’s
and parental rights advocates have spent decades debating which is
the preferable position.184 Moreover, these “either-or” arguments
tend to reject the possibility of a middle ground and the possibility
that both doctrines can coexist.185 However, parental rights and
children’s rights can and must coexist. As the long fight between
children’s rights and parental rights advocates has shown, both
standards have their place but neither one is right for all
circumstances. In the context of undocumented immigrant families,
a parental rights approach is appropriate before deportation, but
once a child’s parents have been deported, reunification and
termination decisions must be made under a best-interest-of-thechild standard.

183. Huntington, supra note 182, at 640 (“Preservationists contend that a misconstrued
articulation of children’s rights and de-emphasis of parents’ rights results in too much
intervention in the home in the form of removal (or threatened removal). Child protectionists
claim that too much emphasis on parents’ rights and a misconstrued articulation of children’s
rights results in too little intervention in the home.”).
184. See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 38–43 (arguing that the best interests
doctrine is “intensely value-laden” and that the parental rights doctrine is preferable);
Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 337
(2004) (noting that the law “generally lets adult interests trump children’s” and that it must be
adjusted to “place greater emphasis on parental responsibilities and children’s rights”); Dwyer,
supra note 121, at 1439 (arguing that children’s rights should trump parental rights); John
Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987)
(discussing the tension between children’s rights and parental rights and concluding that
children’s rights should not trump those of the parents); Alfred A. Mamo, Early Identification
and Prevention of Parent-Child Alienation: A Framework for Balancing Risks and Benefits of
Intervention, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 136, 145 (2010) (“[P]arental rights may need to be trumped
by the children’s rights.”); Christopher Tollefsen, John Paul II and Children’s Education, 21
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 159, 177 (2007) (describing children’s rights
advocate James Dwyer as claiming that “children’s rights should entirely trump any claim to
parental rights”); Erik M. Zimmerman, Note, Defending the Parental Right to Direct
Education: Meyer and Pierce as Bulwarks Against State Indoctrination, 17 REGENT U. L. REV.
311, 332 (2004–2005) (noting that Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and other children’s rights
advocates “would like to replace parental rights with ‘Children’s Rights’”).
185. An example of such consideration is Professor Emily Buss’s thoughtful proposal in
which she suggests allocating parental rights versus children’s rights based on independent
rights asserting conduct of the child. Buss would preference children’s rights over parental
rights in when the rights were sought first by the child. Thus, Buss would rarely, if ever,
consider the rights of minor children to trump parental rights but would be very inclined to
permit this in the cases of older children. Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note
174, at 44. See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (articulating the idea of a flexible,
but perhaps unworkable, standard for parental rights); Rachmilovitz, supra note 182, at 824
(arguing for an aggregation of parental and children’s rights, suggesting that that can be
viewed as “different aspects of the same right”).
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A. The Adoption and Safe Families Act
The idea of a triggering event that justifies a switch from parental
rights to children’s rights may seem novel, but it is not. The
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) demonstrates a
similar compromise between children’s rights and parental rights.
ASFA supports the traditional parental rights framework during the
initial months after a child is removed from his or her parents.
However, after a child has been out of her parents’ care for fifteen
out of the last twenty-two months, the emphasis shifts to a children’s
rights standard.186 After this triggering event, the Act no longer seeks
the traditional parental rights goal of reunification. Instead, the focus
shifts to the best interest of the child and the goal of adoption. Thus,
after this point, the parents’ rights will be terminated unless it is in
the children’s best interest not to have them terminated.
The purpose of ASFA was to give increased consideration to
children’s rights.187 Whereas previous child welfare policy focused on
reunification, and thus on the rights of parents, ASFA’s focus shifted
to termination and the best interest of the child.188 ASFA increased

186. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
187. During the ASFA testimony, Rep. Deborah Pryce of Ohio stated that ASFA would
“elevate children’s rights so that a child’s health and safety will be of paramount concern under
the law . . . . Let us do it for the children.” 143 CONG. REC. H10,776–05, H10,789 (daily ed.
Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce). See also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 208
(noting that ASFA “was widely heralded as a children’s rights victory”); Elizabeth Bartholet,
The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous
Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 928 (2009) (“ASFA is, in my view, a good law because it
shifts the balance in child welfare law and policy somewhat in the direction of valuing
children’s rights more, and parents’ rights less.”).
188. ASFA was passed in response to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
(AACWA), which focused on parental rights and required states to make “reasonable efforts”
at reunification even in cases of child abuse and murder. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006)
(assuring “that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a
child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home,
and (B) to make it possible for the child to safely return to the child’s home”). The
Congressional testimony surrounding the passage of ASFA reveals the disagreement with this
former policy. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S12668 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Jeffords) (“[I]f a parent has been found to have murdered another child in the family, or has
subjected a child to chronic abuse, it is unreasonable—and irrational—to insist that the state
return that child to the family.”); 143 CONG. REC. S12,198 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Helms) (“Foster care children should not be returned to unfit, abusive
parents . . . . Because the current Federal law requires States to make reasonable efforts to
reunite children with their biological parents, children have tragically been returned to their
abusive and sometimes murderous parents.”); 143 CONG. REC. H2012 (daily ed. Apr. 30,
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federal incentives for adoptions and permitted parental rights
terminations for most children who had been in foster care for more
than a year. Although the Act has been the subject of significant
criticism,189 such criticisms are primarily based on the premise that
ASFA terminations do not actually achieve the best interest of the
child.190 The criticism that ASFA violates the parent’s rights is rare.191
Even ASFA’s critics appear to accept ASFA’s premise that there
needs to be increased consideration of children’s best interests in

1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (“[T]he most important change we can make is to elevate the
rights of children because too often a foster child’s best interests are abandoned while courts
and welfare agencies drag their feet. To correct this injustice, H.R. 867 [ASFA] places the
safety and well-being of children above efforts by the State to reunite them with biological
parents who have abused or neglected them.”).
189. See, e.g., Naomi Kahn, Children’s Interest in a Familial Context, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1189, 1204 (1999) (noting for example that the emphasis on termination may be harmful in
instances where adoption prospects are unlikely); Jane Murphy, Protecting Children by
Preserving Parenthood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 969, 981 (2006) (arguing that even if
one “considers ASFA strictly from a child’s perspective, its harm to children as a form of
parentage disestablishment law is apparent”); Deborah Parach, The Orphaning of
Underprivileged Children: America’s Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
119, 158 (2006) (suggesting that courts should always consider the “best interests of the
child” before terminating parental rights and that such a consideration would often counsel
against termination); Dorothy Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights?: The Critique of
Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1999).
190. Courts have also criticized ASFA for its harm to children. See, e.g., In re Adoption of
Corey, 707 N.Y.S.2d 767, 773 (Fam. Ct. 1999) (finding that § 378–a(2)(e)(1) of ASFA
violates the procedural due process rights of foster children because it fails to protect them
from “arbitrary State decisions which significantly impact their custody and welfare”).
191. See Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (2009) (noting that “the expedited timelines of ASFA may conflict”
with parental rights); Catherine J. Ross, Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange Case of
the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints at Yearning for Zion Ranch, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 361
(2008) (criticizing an article on ASFA for its implication that parental rights are no longer
relevant to ASFA terminations). Interestingly, such arguments are often made by law students.
See, e.g., Ian Vandewalker, Note, Taking the Baby Before it is Born, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 423, 442 (2008) (arguing that the ASFA timeline violates the due process rights of
drug addicted mothers because it is well documented that effective drug treatment programs
often take at least two years, more than the time permitted under ASFA); Amy WilkinsonHagen, Note, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision of Parens Patriae and
Parents’ Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 137, 141 (2004) (arguing
that ASFA “harms some parents because its broad language, arbitrary time requirements and
anti-reunification funding schemes apply unfairly to certain parents, therefore violating both
substantive and procedural due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment”). At
the same time, however, Hagen states that ASFA’s purpose of acting in children’s best interests
is “noble and attractive” and “should be a matter of serious concern, even when weighed
against the interests of parents who wish to maintain relationships with their children.” Id. at
140.
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parental termination decisions and that there is a point at which
children’s interests outweigh those of their parents.192 This
agreement regarding the appropriateness of increased attention to
children’s rights is significant and was certainly not a given.
Consequently, it is important to examine why, for the most part,
ASFA’s compromise has been accepted.193
From a parental rights standpoint, ASFA is a threat. The Act
infringes on parents’ rights to the care and custody of their children.
Many of the parents whose rights are terminated under ASFA are not
abusive, but have lost custody of their children due to neglect
resulting from poverty or other circumstances beyond their
control.194 In addition, even in cases of abuse, many of these parents
could become fit parents if provided with the resources and time
needed to correct their behavior. Therefore, because many, or at
least some, of these parents have the potential to remedy the
conditions the led to their child’s removal, termination arguably
violates their parental rights.195
Similarly, from the children’s rights standpoint ASFA does not
go nearly far enough. If parental rights terminations were truly
evaluated according to best interests of the child, the question would
not be whether the parents have the potential to one day become fit
and regain custody but whether having children wait for this
192. Scholarly criticisms of ASFA are primarily that it does not actually achieve the best
interests of children. See supra note 189. It is courts, rather than scholars, who are the most
likely to make the argument that ASFA is unfair to parents. That this position is more likely to
be taken by courts makes sense considering the decades of legal precedent elevating parental
rights over children’s rights. See, e.g., In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 872 (Ill. 2001) (finding it
unfair and unconstitutional to find parents unfit just because they did not achieve reunification
in the required time period and focusing on parental rights and the unfairness of terminating
their rights when the child had been in foster care for “circumstances beyond the parent’s
control”); In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (Fam. Ct. 1999) (recognizing that
ASFA violated both the children’s and the guardian aunt’s due process rights).
193. Again, I am referring to the acceptance of the increased attention to children’s rights
under ASFA. As previously mentioned, other aspects of ASFA have been the subject of
numerous criticisms, particularly with respect to the idea that it does not effectively protect
children’s best interests.
194. The In re H.G. court used the example of substance abusers who had to wait long
periods before they could gain admission into substance abuse recovery programs. 757 N.E.2d
at 872–73.
195. For examples of such challenges, see In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d at 866–67 (finding
that a section of state law presuming parental unfitness where a child was in foster care for
fifteen out of the last twenty-two months was unconstitutional); In re K.R., No. 99–2009,
2000 WL 854325 (Iowa Ct. App. June 28, 2000) (rejecting parents claim that they have a
constitutional right to reunification services).

1185

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/15/2011 1:57 PM

2011

speculative possibility is in the children’s best interest. Under a
children’s rights approach, terminations should occur as soon as it is
in the child’s best interest. This could mean immediate termination
in any case in which the harms of foster care outweighed the
potential benefits of reunification A children’s rights approach does
not give parents many “chances.” However, the protection it affords
children is believed to outweigh the harm it inflicts on parents.
The ASFA compromise infringes on parental rights and does not
fully protect children’s rights, but it was accepted because, by and
large, it still manages to effectuate many of the benefits of both
standards. A parental rights approach to terminations benefits
parents by giving them more time and opportunities to regain
custody of their children; it may benefit children by helping them
return home and avoid a childhood in foster care; and it benefits the
state because, if successful, reunification services are cheaper than
years of foster care. The benefits of a children’s rights approach are
that it protects children from unsafe reunifications,196 frees children
from years of foster care by making them available for adoption
sooner,197 and benefits the State by protecting the health and welfare
of its future adult citizens.198 ASFA largely manages to retain the
benefits of both approaches by switching between the two standards
when the benefits of using children’s rights begin to clearly outweigh
196. Richard P. Barth et al., From Anticipation to Evidence: Research on the Adoption and
Safe Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 371, 372–74 (2005) (citing foster care drift,
efforts “to reunify children with even the most difficult families,” and research showing that
even infants were experiencing multiple foster care placements); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting
Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83
MINN. L. REV. 637, 646–48 (1999) (noting that ASFA was passed in response to concerns
that local CPS agencies were undertaking excessive efforts to rehabilitate parents and were
trying to return children to parents in whose care children could never be safe).
197. As ASFA’s critics note, many of these children have few adoption prospects and thus
receive no benefit from termination. In such circumstances, best interests indicate that parental
rights should not be terminated. To the extent that ASFA mandates terminations even in such
instances indicates a problem with how the Act is applied not with the use of a best interest
standard. See also Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers,
and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176,
179 (2004) (arguing that in some of these cases at the margins, a child would be better served
by a more flexible approach that would consider the child’s interest in reunification and not be
bound by the ridged 15/22 requirement). My analysis accepts the stated benefits of ASFA but
could change based on the conclusion that termination does not achieve the stability and
permanence alleged.
198. By enabling children to be part of a family, their own or a new one, the children’s
rights approach helps to create independent and autonomous citizens, free from state control
and quick adoptions, and also help the state avoid the expense of long term foster care.
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the benefits of using the parental rights standard. The fifteen- to
twenty-two month cutoff represents the point at which the benefits
of parental rights and reunification attempts are outweighed by the
child’s interest in stability and permanence.199
B. Third Party Visitation Cases
Third-party visitation cases are also cases in which, after a
triggering event occurs, the parental rights standard should be
replaced with a children’s rights standard. However, although this is
another example of a compromise between children’s and parental
rights, it is one which I believe is far less effective than both the
ASFA compromise and the immigration reunification compromise I
propose. In these cases, the consideration of the child’s best interest
is likely to cause more harm than good, and thus it is not surprising
that these cases have garnered much criticism.200 An examination of
the third-party visitation cases demonstrates why there has been so
much criticism of these decisions and why such criticism is not
applicable to my proposed immigrant reunification compromise.
The role of children’s best interests in third party visitation cases
gained national attention when the Supreme Court decided Troxel v.
Granville.201 In Troxel, the Court struck down a Washington state
statute that would have permitted any third party to seek visitation at
anytime, regardless of the parent’s objections, so long as the
visitation was deemed to be in the child’s best interest. Although the
Supreme Court found the Washington statute overbroad, the
opinion left open the possibility that less broad visitation statutes

199. The idea behind the “15 of 22” provision stems from the definitive 1973 book,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973), in which the authors argued that a child’s normal
psychological development depends on a secure and uninterrupted relationship with one
caregiver and that the impermanency of foster care was detrimental to children’s emotional
well-being. See also Jennifer Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical
Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of Parental Rights,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251 (1996) (noting this work as the driving idea behind the AFSA
permanency provision).
200. Unlike termination cases, there is significant scholarly writing arguing that thirdparty visitation should be decided under a parental rights standard. See, e.g., Lawrence Schlam,
Third-Party “Standing” and Child Custody Disputes in Washington: Non-Parents Rights—Past,
Present, and . . . Future?, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 391, 459 (2007–08) (arguing in favor of a best
interest standard for third party visitation cases).
201. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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would pass constitutional muster.202 Troxel thus indicated that
parental rights to determine who could visit their child were not
absolute203 and that increased consideration of the child’s best
interest in these cases was permissible.204 Post-Troxel, many courts
embraced the idea that best interest considerations are appropriate in
third-party visitation cases205 and that third-party visitation claims
should be evaluated in terms of children’s rights and interests rather
than parental rights.
For example, in Downs v. Sheffler,206 the Arizona Court of
Appeals recently held that “in instances where a fit parent’s right to
rear her child may conflict with the child’s best interests, the extent
of a parent’s constitutional right . . . can only be determined by
weighing that right against countervailing factors, if any, pertaining
to the best interests of the child.”207 Such conclusions are

202. Id. at 73; see also Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v.
Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 311 (2000) [hereinafter Buss, Adrift in the Middle]
(“Taken together, the Court’s refusal to embrace any specific parent-protective standard and
its apparent openness to visitation statutes that require courts to make best interests
assessments reveal how far the Troxel Court drifted from its fundamental rights course.”).
203. See Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparents’ House We
Go: Or Do We, Post-Troxel?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 793 (2001) (describing the assertion that
“parental rights are not absolute” as a “glittering generality” throughout the opinion);
Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody Disputes in Arizona: Best Interests to
Parental Rights—And Shifting the Balance Back Again, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 733 (2005)
(describing the Troxel decision as the finding that court “must perform a balancing of the
fundamental rights of the parents with those of the child and state”).
204. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A parent’s rights with
respect to her child have thus never been regarded as absolute . . . a parent’s interest in a child
must be balanced against the State’s long-recognized interests as parens patriae . . . . [To] the
extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be
balanced in the equation.”); id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one believes the parental
rights are to be absolute.”).
205. However, it should be noted that scholarly support for best interests is mixed.
Compare Sonya Garza, The Troxel Aftermath, 69 LA. L. REV. 927 (2009) (“Post-Troxel, many
jurisdictions continue to allow third-party visitation petitions to be filed at any time and should
continue to do so.”), with Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 174 (arguing
that by affording parents only a weak parental right, the Troxel court opened children up to
harm through increased litigation).
206. 80 P.3d 775, 781 (Ariz. App. 2003).
207. Id. See also In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006); Vibbert v. Vibbert,
144 S.W.3d 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000);
Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. 2002); Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 521–22
(Mont. 2006); In re Marriage of O’Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004); Hiller v.
Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006).
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questionable. A comparison of the pros and cons of using a best
interests test in visitation cases demonstrates that a parent’s decision
not to allow third-party visitation with his or her child does not
support switching from a parental rights standard to a children’s
rights standard.
The triggering event in third-party visitation cases is the parent’s
decision to reduce or eliminate contact with a third party. However,
unlike the triggering event in ASFA and immigrant termination
cases, this trigger does not shift the benefit analysis in favor of
applying a children’s rights standard. Thus, it is not surprising that
the decision has been the subject of significant criticism.208 In thirdparty visitation cases, a parental rights standard benefits parents
because it protects their right to make decisions regarding their
children, guards against outside intrusions into their home and
family, and indicates respect for their authority and judgment.
Similarly, a parental rights approach benefits the state by ensuring
the independence and autonomy of the family, which, as discussed
above, is crucial for the development of future citizens. A parental
rights approach to visitation cases also benefits children. This
standard ensures that decisions about whom the child visits are made
by a fit custodial parent, the person most knowledgeable about the
child’s life and needs and the person most likely to make decisions in
the child’s best interest.209 Lastly, a parental rights standard protects
208. See Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 202, at 313 (expressing worry that
Troxel’s “in-between approach” gave too little guidance “to state and federal courts, charged
with resolving the host of cases that Troxel [would] inspire”); Janet L. Dolgin, The
Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 377 (2002)
(ascribing significant social and legal confusion to Troxel and similar decisions); Marrus, supra
note 203, at 793 (observing that Troxel disappointed and “raised expectations that the Justices
would provide clear guidance on how and when states could or could not interfere with the
parent’s decisions regarding visitation between the child and third parties”); David D. Meyer,
Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American Family, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 711, 712
(2001) (arguing that Troxel signals the emergence of a flexible standard for parental rights, but
that it is itself incoherent, “emerg[ing] finally from a meandering tour of hoary platitudes too
general to be helpful and factual details so case-specific as to give little guidance for the
future”); Christina M. Alderfer, Note, Troxel v. Granville: A Missed Opportunity to Elucidate
Children’s Rights, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 963, 1005 (2001) (“The Court took a middle ground
in this case, thereby offending no one. Unfortunately, the standard for governmental
interference with parental rights remains extremely vague.”).
209. As stated by Professor Emily Buss, “Because the parent knows herself, her child, and
her entire household better than the state knows them, and stands in a position of greater
influence than the state over the behavior of all three, the parent is best situated to decide what
private relationships should be fostered.” “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 649 (2002).
In addition, Buss argues that parental rights benefit children because parents perform better as
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children by promoting the stability and security that come from the
knowledge that parental decisions will be followed and are not
subject to interference by third parties or the state,210 and by
protecting them from the hostility and invective that often
accompanies forced visitation.211 These are significant benefits and
benefits that largely remain even after a parent has unjustly denied a
third party visitation.
Examining these cases from a children’s rights approach reveals
that children’s rights arguments are not particularly compelling and
that this conclusion does not change even after the triggering
event—the denial of third-party visitation—has occurred. A
children’s rights approach to third-party visitation means that
visitation decisions would be made according to a child’s best
interest. Thus, a parent could not deny a child visitation with a third
party if such visitation was in the child’s best interest.
The benefit of such a standard is that a child could not be forced
by a parental whim to lose contact with a person with whom the
child wished to have a relationship. While it is likely that maintaining
such relationships will often benefit children, it is not at all clear that

parents if they have “near absolute control over the upbringing of their children.” However,
Buss notes that “[t]his is not to say that depriving children of particular relationships will never
be harmful, but rather that we simply cannot expect the state to have any comparative
advantage over parents in assessing that harm.” Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 202, at
287, 290. Moreover, most of these third party visitation cases involve very young children,
making it extremely difficult to know whether such visitation truly represents their preference.
Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 174, at 38 (“Associational rights claims,
now commonly asserted by interested adults such as grandparents on behalf of young children,
would be rare if limited to instances in which children took some form of affirmative action to
express their associational choices.”).
210. Children’s fears of being taken away are well documented. Children will often not
talk about violence in their homes out of fear they will be taken away from their parents. See
Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their Children in the
Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273, 285 (1999) (“Some children
fear, legitimately, that if they talk about violence in their homes they will be taken away from
both their parents”). Further, the stress children feel when visitation occurs against a custodial
parent’s wishes is well documented in the context of divorce. See generally Benjamin Garber,
Conceptualizing Visitation Resistance and Refusal in the Context of Parental Conflict,
Separation and Divorce, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 588 (2007).
211. Michele A. Adams, Framing Contests in Child Custody Cases: Parental Alienation
Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Father’s Rights, 40 FAM. L.Q. 315, 324–327 (2006);
James H. Bray, Psychosocial Factors Affecting Custodial and Visitation Arrangements, 9 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 419 (1991); Douglas Darnell, Parental Alienation: Not in the Best Interest of the
Children, 75 N.D. L. REV. 323, 323 (1999) (“Ideally, parents deliberately work on comforting
and reassuring the children that no harm will come to them.”).

1190

DO NOT DELETE

1139

10/15/2011 1:57 PM

Should I Stay or Should I Go

the price of maintaining these relationships, namely the significant
infringement on parental control and decision making, is justified by
this benefit. The potential harm to family stability and security is
significant, whereas the harm caused by a parent’s unjustified
decision to prohibit visitation is arguably minimal.212 Typically, the
worst case scenario in third party visitation cases is that the denial of
visitation will prevent a child from developing or maintaining close
relationship with a third party, such as a grandparent, that would
have been beneficial for the child. While there is little question that
such a denial may not be in the child’s best interest and may even
harm the child, this possible harm is not on par with the potential
harms discussed in connection with ASFA and undocumented
immigrant termination decisions.
The above analysis demonstrates that the benefits of a parental
rights approach to these visitation cases far outweigh the benefits of a
children’s rights approach. Nevertheless, post-Troxel courts are
increasingly receptive to best interest considerations. These best
interest considerations are far less compelling than those present in
the case of undocumented immigrant parental rights terminations,
yet they are increasingly accepted. Consequently, if applying a
children’s rights standard in third party visitation cases is increasingly
permissible, it seems axiomatic that such a standard is appropriate in
undocumented immigrant parental rights termination cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
Terminating the rights of fit parents is an enormous violation of
a person’s parental rights. However, the best interests of the child
justify this violation when those interests align with the best interests
of the state. Allowing undocumented immigrant parental
termination decisions to be made according to a best-interest-of-thechild standard does not mean that children will automatically be
barred from reunification with their deported parents, but it does
mean that these decisions will be made according to the child’s best
interest. As a result, in some cases fit immigrant parents will lose
custody of their children, and this should be allowed to happen.

212. A possible exception could be a case such as Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162
(S.C. Ct. App. 2006), where the third party was denied visitation after he began suspecting the
mother of physically abusing the child. However even in that type of situation, the parents’
denial of visitation rights does not prevent the third party from reporting suspicions of abuse.

1191

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1192

10/15/2011 1:57 PM

2011

